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Abstract: Developed countries increasingly compete for a pool of talented
students from developing countries. This competition induces host countries to
vertically di¤erentiate their education programmes: some countries supply a higher
educational quality and charge higher tuition fees, while others provide a lower
quality for lower tuition fees. This paper argues that the educational quality of
high-quality countries, the national tuition fees and the quality and tuition fee
di¤erentials between the countries all increase as the income prospects for graduates
in the developing countries catch up with the developed world and the number
of international students grows. If foreign students become more likely to stay in
their host country after graduation, the implications will be more ambiguous. In
particular, an increase in educational quality can be accompanied by a decline in
tuition fees. Intensied competition for international students does not necessarily
disadvantage developing countries, since they might even benet from a brain gain.
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A foreign graduate from a local university is likely to be well-qualied,
uent in the local lingo and at ease with local customs.
Countries should be vying to attract such people.
(The Economist, January 30th, 2016: 10-11.)
1 Motivation
Higher education has become increasingly internationalised over the last decades.
On the demand side, talented students increasingly aim at receiving an excellent
education even if this requires being internationally mobile and studying abroad. In
particular, many students from developing countries consider a degree from a uni-
versity in a developed country as a chance to enhance their career prospects at home
and abroad. On the supply side, university programmes increasingly accommodate
the needs of foreign students in order to attract international talent. As a result,
the number of international students (i.e., students enrolled outside their country
of citizenship) has grown considerably over the last thirty years. Between 2000 and
2012, the number of foreign students within OECD countries has increased from 2.1
to 4.5 million (OECD 2014: 344). Asia is by far the largest sending region. Students
from China and India alone constitute 22% and 6% of the students from OECD
partner countries enrolled within the OECD (OECD 2015: 359).
In the host countries, the benets from foreign students are substantial. In the
short run, foreign students generate additional revenues from tuition fees and posi-
tive spillovers to domestic students and universities. In the long run, the acquisition
of international students increases the future number of skilled workers, as many for-
eign students will continue to stay in their host countries after graduation (see, e.g.,
Dreher and Poutvaara 2011; Finn 2003; Rosenzweig 2008). The OECD estimates
that investing in the tertiary education of foreign students yields a net public return
of more than USD 127,000 (65,000) for a man (woman) in present value terms, ac-
counting for future tax revenues, social security contributions and social transfers as
well as direct and indirect public costs of higher education (OECD 2015: 127). This
positive e¤ect also reects the fact that during their studies foreign students acquire
not only the necessary professional but also language and cultural skills which enable
them to integrate into the labour market of the host country easily.
Recent measures of several OECD countries to promote the access of interna-
tional students to the domestic labour market indicate that countries are aware of
the associated benets (see, e.g., Chalo¤ and Lemaitre 2009). As a result, about 25%
of the foreign students in the OECD member states nowadays stay upon graduation
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in their host countries (OECD, 2011: 330). In fact, countries such as Australia, New
Zealand and Japan consider attracting growing numbers of foreign students as part
of a broader socio-economic development strategy (OECD 2011: 324-325).
However, the supply of talent is limited, and ability varies among international
students. This gives rise to an intense competition between developed countries for
the international pool of talent. Also, changes in the socio-economic environment will
continue to transform this competition. Notably, the size of the pool of talent from
developing countries will continue to grow over the next decades. At the same time,
the share of international students who stay in their host country after graduation
(i.e., the stay rate) is very likely to change too. Finally, major sending countries,
such as China and India, will continue to catch up with the developed countries and
provide better income prospects for graduates who return to these countries.
The aim of our paper is to analyse the competition between developed countries
for the pool of talent from developing countries and its implications. In particular, we
explore how the aforementioned changes in the socio-economic environment will alter
the outcome of this international competition. This analysis will not only provide
some hints about future trends in the developed countries, but also shed new light
on the discussion of brain drain and brain gain.
To this end, we apply a model with duopolistic competition and vertical product
di¤erentiation.1 Two developed countries compete for a pool of students from de-
veloping countries by non-cooperatively setting educational quality and tuition fees.
They aim at maximising their net benets from educating foreign students, which
includes future tax payments of those who continue to stay in the host country.
In equilibrium, one country o¤ers a high-quality education at high tuition fees and
attracts the brightest students, while the other country provides a lower educational
quality at low tuition fees and receives the less talented students.
More interestingly, educational quality, tuition fees and the allocation of students
respond sensitively to changes in the socio-economic environment, i.e., to changes
in the size of the talent pool, the stay rate and the income prospects for graduates
who return to their home countries in the developing world. All three changes un-
ambiguously increase the quality of education in the high-quality country and widen
the quality gap between the two host countries. In contrast, the conclusions about
tuition fees are less clear-cut. Both an enlarged pool of talent and enhanced income
prospects for returning graduates raise the tuition fees in the two countries and the
1Models of oligopolistic competition with vertically di¤erentiated products are frequently used
in the literature on industrial economics. See, e.g., Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and
Sutton (1982) for seminal papers and section 4.4 of this paper for a further discussion.
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tuition fee di¤erential. A higher stay rate of foreign students after graduation leads
to ambiguous results. In this case, the tuition fees in both countries and the tuition
fee di¤erential can decline. Finally, a higher stay rate implies that a larger share of
international students end up in the high-quality country. By contrast, in the case
of rising income prospects for graduates in the developing world, and only in this
case, the allocation of students can shift in favour of the low-quality country.
As a further important point, this paper stresses a new mechanism that causes a
brain gain in the context of inter-country competition. In our basic model, the policy
responses of the developed countries to an increase in the stay rate and the size of
the talent pool unambiguously yield a qualitative brain gain, as the average human
capital of the returning graduates increases. However, a larger stay rate also leads
to a quantitative brain drain, as fewer students return to the developing regions.
Our concept of competition goes beyond the notion of mere inter-university com-
petition for students. Rather, we consider governments as pivotal actors in the inter-
national competition for the pool of talent. As already mentioned above, countries
such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan consider higher education policies that at-
tract foreign talent as an explicit part of their socio-economic strategy. New Zealand,
for instance, raised the quality of higher education and, in 2005, reduced the tuition
fees for foreign students to become more competitive (OECD 2011: 325).
While governments can directly regulate tuition fees and inuence the educa-
tional quality of public universities, they might nd directing private universities
more di¢cult, depending on the precise institutional circumstances. In the absence
of public universities, competition between completely uncontrolled private univer-
sities indeed yields some results that di¤er from our conclusions above, as we will
argue. However, as long as public universities exist, the presence of completely un-
controlled private universities need not invalidate our conclusions, as our account
of the case of domestic competition between public and private universities will
highlight. Finally, we explore whether, and to what extent, distinguishing between
investments in specic educational quality, which is to the benet of international
students only, and general educational quality, which is to the benet of both do-
mestic and international students, drives our results.
Our analysis contributes to the literature on higher education policy and interna-
tional competition for mobile students. For instance, Del Rey (2001) concludes that
when international students return to their home countries after graduation, gov-
ernments tend to underinvest in educational quality to discourage foreign students
from free-riding on the domestic systems. Demange and Fenge (2010) argue that in-
ternational competition for students leads to ine¢cient levels of educational quality,
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as attracting foreign students who partly continue to stay in the host country after
graduation implies a negative externality for the country of origin.2 Our contribu-
tion di¤ers from these two papers in three ways. Firstly, we analyse competition in
both tuition fees and quality of education, while both other papers consider qual-
ity competition only.3 Expanding the policy space allows us to show, for instance,
that quality levels and tuition fees can move in opposite directions if the stay rate
of foreign students after graduation increases. Secondly, we analyse how the non-
cooperative quality levels and tuition fees vary with changes in the socio-economic
environment, while the papers referred to above focus on exploring the welfare prop-
erties of non-cooperative equilibria. Thirdly, considering explicitly a pool of students
from developing countries, we can derive some conclusions about the impact of in-
ternational competition for talent on brain drain and brain gain.
Kemnitz (2007a) analyses how di¤erent funding schemes and di¤erent degrees of
university autonomy a¤ect the competition between universities. He applies a model
with vertical product di¤erentiation in which tuition fees and educational quality
are endogenously determined, similar to the one we use. However, he considers a
closed economy, while we focus on international competition for students. Thus, the
questions we raise, such as e¤ects of a higher stay rate on education policy, are
naturally not part of his analysis, although the underlying model types are similar.4
Our paper also contributes to the literature on brain drain and brain gain (e.g.,
Beine et al. 2008; Eggert et al. 2010; Stark et al. 1997, 1998; Stark and Wang,
2002; Vidal, 1998). This literature stresses that international mobility reinforces
private incentives to invest in education, and thus might increase human capital
in developing countries. We show how socio-economic changes alter the education
policy in the host countries of students from developing countries, and how this
might increase human capital in developing countries. In this respect, the current
paper is similar to Haupt et al. (2014) who analyse the relationship between the
stay rate of students from developing countries, the education policy of a single
developed host country and human capital in developing countries. In contrast to
2Several papers cover the e¤ects of mobility on education systems in di¤erent but related con-
texts such as education policy and federalism (e.g., Büttner and Schwager, 2004; Hübner, 2012;
Kemnitz, 2007b) and competition between cities and public schooling (Hoyt and Jensen, 2001).
See also De Fraja and Iossa (2002), Gérard (2007), Krieger and Lange (2010), Lange (2009, 2013).
3Beine et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence for the impact of destination-specic factors on
the location choice of international students. In line with our model, they show that an interaction
term of tuition fees and education quality is a signicant predictor of student inows.
4Like Kemnitz (2007a), Grazzini et al. (2010) and Boadway et al. (1996) explore competition
between universities or private schools within a jurisdiction.
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Haupt et al. (2014), the current paper explores the competition between developed
countries for the international pool of talent and can thus assess, for instance, how
several socio-economic changes a¤ect the tuition fee di¤erential across countries.
Our paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we set up the basic model. Section
3 analyses the competition between two host countries for the international pool
of talent. In section 4, we explain how socio-economic changes shape education
policies and student allocation. Section 5 explores the implications for the stock of
human capital in developing countries. In section 6, we consider the role of domestic
students. Section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Governments and International Students
We apply a duopoly model with vertical product di¤erentiation. In this section, we
explain its components and start by exploring student characteristics.
International Students The size of the international student population is ex-
ogenous and denoted by N . It represents the total demand from the Rest-of-the-
World (ROW) for education in two ex ante identical host countries 1 and 2. Each
of these ROW students studies in one of the two host countries. More precisely,
this pool of international talent can be considered as the student population from
developing countries who enrol at universities in developed countries.
The ROW students di¤er in their ability, denoted by a. The ability a is uniformly
distributed over the unit interval, i.e., a 2 [0; 1]. It captures the capacity to exploit
the quality of higher education, as reected by their future gross wage. This future
gross wage w consists of a graduate base salary w and an educational quality
premium aqi, where qi  0 denotes the quality of education the individual receives
in the host country i, i = 1; 2. That is, w = w+aqi. Ability and university quality are
complementary in the production of the educational quality premium. The resulting
labour income is taxed at the exogenous rate  2 (0; 1) in each of the developed
countries 1 and 2. In contrast to those who continue to stay in their host country
and earn gross wage w, the individuals who return to their native ROW country
earn gross wage w,  2 [0; 1], which is taxed at the exogenous rate ROW 2 (0; 1).
Although labour incomes in the developed host countries usually exceed those
in ROW (and we will assume that this is the case), there are usually non-economic
reasons for foreign students to return to their home countries after graduation.
Examples for such motives are failure of social integration in the host country, private
and family ties to the country of origin, homesickness and problems with regard to
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the change of status from student to permanent immigrant in the host country. These
non-economic motives are captured by an exogenous repatriation rate (1  p). That
is, with probability p 2 (0; 1) individuals stay in their host country after graduation
and receive a net wage (1 )w. With probability (1 p), they return to their native
country and earn net wage (1  ROW )w.
When migrating, individuals already anticipate that they will stay on in the host
country only with probability p; however, information on whether they belong to
the group of repatriates is only revealed after graduation.5 Thus, the expected net
labour income of a graduate with ability a is
Efwag = %(w+ aqi); where % := %(p; ) = p(1  ) + (1  p)(1  ROW ) > 0: (1)
As the two host countries represent the developed parts of the world, and as
ROW stands for the developing region, the net labour income of a graduate in
ROW never exceeds that in the developed countries:
Assumption 1 (1  )  (1  ROW )  0.
This assumption implies that staying in the host country after graduation is
benecial on pure income grounds.6 Only non-economic motives induce graduates
to return to their native country with probability p, as discussed above. This eco-
nomic attractiveness of the developed host countries creates the asymmetry between
sending and receiving countries which is typical for brain drain models. Furthermore,
we assume that the graduate base salary w is su¢cient to make studying abroad
benecial for all individuals in the pool of talent. That is, we consider a market for
higher education that is completely covered.
Governments The government of each host country sets its tuition fee for higher
education ti and the quality of education qi. Providing educational quality causes
5We ignore the possibility that a foreign-born graduate moves from the host country of education
to the other developed country in order to work there. This assumption is not too restrictive.
Firstly, after having studied several years in the host country, graduates are already (at least
partly) integrated into, and attached to, their host society. Secondly, during the studies in the host
country, graduates are acquiring country-specic skills which generate a higher return in the host
country than in the other developed country. Thirdly, graduates usually nd it easier to integrate
into the labour market of the their host country than of another developed country. In addition,
many host countries facilitate visa and work-permit processes if the applicant has successfully
graduated from a domestic university (see Chalo¤ and Lamaitre, 2009).
6Note, however, that there is some variation across sending countries in terms of both the base
wage and the skill premium (Rosenzweig 2006, 2008). Thus, returning home might be attractive
in some cases, but not in the majority (on which we focus).
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variable costs per student c(qi) = qi,  2 [0; 1], and xed costs F (qi), where F (qi)
is a twice continuously di¤erentiable function with @F=@qi > 0, @
2F=@q2i > 0 and
F (0) = 0. Tuition fees do not necessarily cover these costs, and need not be positive,
as a country might subsidise international students.
Each government receives a net benet, or rent, from o¤ering higher education
to international students
Ri = Wi +Ni[ti   c(qi)]  F (qi); (2)
where Ni and Wi stand for the number of international students in country i (with
N1+N2 = N) and the expected wage sum, or tax base, generated by the international
students who continue to stay and work in country i, respectively. A country gains
from international students, as they pay tuition fees Niti and generate expected
tax revenues Wi. These benets are diminished by the variable and xed costs of
education c(qi) and F (qi).
Timing Decisions take place in three stages. In the rst stage, the two governments
simultaneously choose educational qualities q1 and q2. In the second stage, the two
governments set tuition fees t1 and t2. In the third stage, ROW students decide
whether to study in country 1 or in country 2, having perfect information about
tuition fees and quality levels. Each government maximises its net benet (2), and
each individual maximises their expected income net of taxes and tuition fees %(w+
aqi)  ti (i.e., expected net income minus tuition fees).
Extensions Taken literally, this basic model captures most adequately competi-
tion between two countries with fairly egalitarian, publicly owned and controlled
university systems. Therefore, we occasionally refer to the competition in this basic
model as public competition or competition between public universities. To take
account of the variety of higher education systems and the fact that the government
might have limited control over private institutions, we later discuss competition
between uncontrolled private universities and domestic competition between pri-
vate and public universities (see section 4.4). In an extension, we also incorporate
domestic students into our model (see sections 6).
3 Quality and Tuition Fee Competition
We solve this three-stage game recursively and look for a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium. Hence, we begin by analysing the migration choices of the ROW students.
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Migration Decisions In the third stage, each ROW student decides whether to
migrate to, and study in, country 1 or country 2, given tuition fees (t1; t2) and
educational qualities (q1; q2).
7 Comparing the individual net benets %(w+aq1)  t1
and %(w+aq2)  t2 reveals that individuals choose country 2 (country 1) if and only
if their ability a is above (strictly below) the threshold value
a^ =
t2   t1
%q
. (3)
where q := q2   q1 denotes the regional quality di¤erential.
Focusing on the case in which quality di¤erentials across countries emerge, we
assume, without loss of generality, that country 2 is the high-quality provider, i.e.,
q > 0. (We explore in appendix A why q2 = q1 cannot be an equilibrium.) Then,
all students would obviously enrol in country 2 if the tuition fee t2 were less than
or equal to tuition fee t1. For t2 > t1, only individuals with a high ability a  a^ > 0
nd it benecial to study in country 2, since their high ability allows them to exploit
the higher educational quality e¤ectively and to recoup the higher private costs of
education. The other students choose the low-price study programme in country 1.
Thus, the number of international students is N1 = a^N in the low-quality country
1 and N2 = (1  a^)N in high-quality country 2.
Then, the wage sums, or tax bases, of the two countries are
W1 = pN
Z a^
0
(w + aq1)da = pa^N

w +
1
2
a^q1

, (4)
W2 = pN
Z 1
a^
(w + aq2)da = p (1  a^)N

w +
1
2
(1 + a^) q2

, (5)
where the threshold value a^ is given by (3). The sums comprise the expected number
of foreign-born workers, pa^N and p (1  a^)N , and the corresponding average labour
income, w + 1
2
a^q1 and w +
1
2
(1 + a^) q2. The terms
1
2
a^q1 and
1
2
(1 + a^) q2 capture the
average human capital of foreign-born workers, or educational quality premium, in
country 1 and 2.
Tuition Fee Competition Having analysed the students migration choices, we
now turn to the tuition fee competition in the second stage. Using the student
demands N1 and N2 and the resulting wage sums W1 and W2, captured by (4) and
(5), we rearrange the objective functions of the two governments:
R1 = a^N

p

w +
1
2
a^q1

+ t1   c(q1)

| {z }
variable net rent r1
  F (q1), (6)
7Note that we assume that foreign students, when making their migration decision, have indeed
perfect information about the levels of tuition fees and educational quality in the two host countries.
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R2 = (1  a^)N

p

w +
1
2
(1 + a^) q2

+ t2   c(q2)

| {z }
variable net rent r2
  F (q2). (7)
The terms in braces capture the countries expected variable net benet from each
student, consisting of expected future tax payments and current tuition fees less
variable education costs. The last term in each line stands for the xed costs of
education.
Each government i chooses the tuition fee ti that maximises rent Ri, thereby
taking the educational qualities (q1; q2), which were determined in the rst stage,
and the other governments tuition fee tj as given. When raising the tuition fees,
government i faces a trade-o¤. Obviously, the students who still migrate to country
i pay more for their education. Also, as higher fees deter students, the variable
public spending on education decreases. However, fewer students pay tuition fees.
Moreover, the decrease in student numbers reduces future tax revenues. Balancing
these opposing e¤ects gives country is best response function tbri (tj; q1; q2), which
follows from the rst-order condition dRi=dti = 0 as long as the corresponding
second-order condition is satised (see the proof of lemma 1 in appendix A).
Then, the equilibrium tuition fees (t1; t

2), which simultaneously solve t

1 =
tbr1 (t

2; q1; q2) and t

2 = t
br
2 (t

1; q1; q2), are given by
t1 (q1; q2) =
%[%q   pq1 + (q2 + 2q1)]
p + 3%
  pw, (8)
t2 (q1; q2) =
%[2%q   pq1 + (q1 + 2q2)]
p + 3%
  pw, (9)
leading to the tuition fee di¤erential
t (q) := t2   t

1 = 
(p; %)q, where 
 (p; %) =
%( + %)
p + 3%
> 0. (10)
Obviously, the country that o¤ers a higher educational quality strengthens the de-
mand for its education system and can thus raise its tuition fees above the fee level
of its competitor, thereby at least partly passing on the higher education costs.
The equilibrium tuition fees determine the equilibrium allocation of students:
a^ =
 + %
p + 3%
, (11)
which follows directly from inserting the tuition fee di¤erential (10) into the ability
threshold (3). Importantly, the equilibrium threshold level a^ does not depend on the
educational quality di¤erentialq. That is, every change in the quality di¤erential is
o¤set by a proportional change in the equilibrium tuition fees so that the allocation
of students to the two countries remains unaltered.
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Educational Quality Competition In the rst stage, government i chooses the
educational quality qi that maximises its net benet Ri. Each government takes the
quality of education abroad as given and anticipates the implication of its quality
decision for the tuition fee competition in the second stage. Taking the equilibrium
tuition fees (8) and (9) and the threshold value (11) into account, the marginal e¤ect
of the educational quality q1  0 on net benet R1 is
dR1
dq1
= a^N

p
2
a^ +
@t1
@q1
 
@c
@q1

 
@F
@q1
=  
N
2
(p + 2%)a^2| {z }
dr1=dq1=
 
@F
@q1
< 0. (12)
Since the marginal impact is always negative, the optimal educational quality of
country 1 is q1 = 0.
8 The intuition for this solution is straightforward. Any increase
in the educational quality of the low-quality country not only drives up both xed
and variable costs, it also intensies the tuition fee competition in the second stage
because of the diminished quality di¤erential. As a result, the per student bene-
t that accrues to country 1 declines. Consequently, the government of country 1
di¤erentiates the educational quality as much as possible to relax the tuition fee
competition.
The circumstances are di¤erent for country 2. Its optimal educational quality q2
is indeed positive and implicitly determined by the rst-order condition9
dR2
dq2
= (1  a^)N

p
2
(1 + a^) +
@t2
@q2
 
@c
@q2

 
@F
@q2
=
N
2
(p + 2%)(1  a^)2| {z }
dr2=dq2=
 
@F
@q2
= 0. (13)
An increase in the quality of education in the high-quality country 2 raises the human
capital of future skilled workers, leading to higher wages and higher expected tax
payments. It also widens the gap between the two countries educational systems
which, in turn, weakens tuition fee competition and drives up tuition fees. Higher
future tax payments and current tuition fees mean that country 2s variable benet
from each student increases, despite growing variable costs. This positive impact on
the variable net rent r2 has to be balanced against the rise in xed costs.
8A quality level qi = 0 must not be interpreted as no quality at all. It rather means that the
countrys university just fulls the minimum requirements for higher education.
9The second-order condition is fullled, as d2R2=dq
2
2
=  @2F=@q2
2
< 0.
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Importantly, quality levels q2 and q

1, which follow from conditions (12) and (13),
can only be an equilibrium of the three-stage game if the tuition fees (8) and (9)
indeed constitute an equilibrium of the second stage, which in turn requires that the
corresponding second-order conditions d2R1=dt
2
1 < 0 and d
2R2=dt
2
2 < 0 are satised.
As we show in the proof of lemma 1, the condition d2R2=dt
2
2 < 0 is always fullled,
and the condition d2R1=dt
2
1 < 0 is satised for q

2 > q

1 = 0 and in the larger
neighbourhood of these quality levels. In fact, tuition fees (8) and (9) establish a
unique equilibrium of the second stage for q2 > q

1 = 0. Thus, the educational quality
levels characterised by conditions (12) and (13) are indeed a local equilibrium of the
three-stage game. That is, no government can improve its net benet by unilaterally
choosing another educational quality in the larger neighbourhood of q2 or q

1.
We summarise the equilibrium properties in lemma 1.
Lemma 1 A local equilibrium with the following properties exists. One host country
of the ROW students provides a higher quality of education and charges higher tuition
fees than the other host country. More precisely, q2 > q

1 = 0 and t

2 > t

1. The high-
quality country attracts the brightest students from the international pool of talent,
i.e., those with a 2 [a^; 1].
The proofs of all lemmas and propositions are relegated to appendix A.
4 Competition in a Changing Environment
Now we turn to the question of how a changing socio-economic environment, as
highlighted in section 1, a¤ects the international competition for the pool of talent.
More specically, we consider three scenarios: an increase in (i) the stay rate of
foreign students, (ii) the income prospects of graduates in developing countries,
and (iii) the size of the talent pool. We show how these changes a¤ect educational
quality, tuition fees, and the allocation of students. This analysis considers marginal
socio-economic changes that marginally shift the equilibrium policies. It helps us
to understand potential future trends in higher education and to assess possible
consequences of these changes for the sending countries of talented students.
4.1 Stay Rate of Foreign Students
Technological, societal or political developments can explain changes in the stay
rate of foreign students in their host countries.10 Let "q;p := (dq=dp)(p=q),
10Technological progress has led to plummeting communication and travel costs. As a result,
people who work abroad can keep in touch with their relatives and friends at home more easily
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"
;p := (@
=@p)(p=
), "
;% = (@
=@%)(%=
) and "%;p := (@%=@p)(p=%) (recall that 

is dened in (10)), then proposition 1 summarises the impact of an increase in the
stay rate p on quality levels, tuition fees and the allocation of students as follows:
Proposition 1 An increase in the stay rate of foreign students after graduation in
the host countries of education
(i) raises the educational quality q2 (i.e, dq

2=dp > 0), but it does not a¤ect the
educational quality q1 = 0 (thus, dq
=dp > 0);
(ii) has an ambiguous e¤ect on the tuition fees t1 and t

2 and on the tuition fee
di¤erential t. In particular,
dt
dp
T 0 , "q;p + "
;p + "
;%"%;p T 0; (14)
(iii) raises the share of foreign students who study in the high-quality country (i.e.,
d(1  a^)=dp > 0).
To elucidate the impact of the stay rate p on the equilibrium outcome, we begin
by considering a special case, which highlights the main mechanisms, and turn to
the more general setting afterwards.
Special case: ROW =  and  = 1.
In this special case, we have % = 1    . That is, the parameter % and thus the
expected net labour income of a student E fwag are independent of the stay rate p
(see (1)), also implying "%;p = 0. Consequently, the allocation of the students a^
 only
depends on the ratio of the tuition fee di¤erential to the quality di¤erentialt=q.
That is, there is no direct e¤ect of the stay rate on the allocation of students, i.e.,
(@a^=@%) (@%=@p) = 0 (see (3)). Then, the stay rate a¤ects the equilibrium allocation
only via its impact on the countries policies, which we now discuss.
Educational Quality A higher stay rate p causes a direct tax revenue e¤ect
on educational quality q2. It increases the expected future tax payment of a for-
eign student in country 2. More importantly, as fewer students leave their host
country after graduation, the positive impact of a higher educational quality on
the expected per-student contribution to the future tax revenues is reinforced (i.e.,
and at lower costs. This reduces the psychological and nancial burden of staying abroad after
graduation, and can thus boost the stay rate of foreign students. Also, recent measures of developed
countries to open up labour market access to foreign graduates contribute to higher stay rates.
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@2W 2 = (@q

2@p) > 0). This strengthens country 2s incentive to invest in educational
quality. It thus raises its quality level q2.
At the same time, country 1 continues to face an incentive to di¤erentiate its
quality level from that of its opponent as much as possible in order to soften the
ensuing tuition fee competition. This incentive, which is discussed in section 3, does
not wither away with increasing stay rates. Therefore, country 1 sticks to its quality
level q1 = 0, and the quality di¤erential q
 widens as the stay rate p increases.
Tuition Fees The impact of the stay rate on tuition fees is ambiguous. In partic-
ular, using t = 
(p; %(p))q (see (10)) we nd that
dt
dp
= 

q
p
("q;p + "
;p + "
;%"%;p) , (15)
where the elasticities are dened at the beginning of this section. In our special
case, the third term in the brackets vanishes as "%;p = 0. Then, the overall e¤ect
of the stay rate on tuition fees can be decomposed into two components. Firstly,
there is an educational quality e¤ect on tuition fees. The widening quality gap that
follows from a higher stay rate weakens tuition fee competition. The two countries
face an incentive to raise their tuition fees. This incentive is particularly strong for
country 2, which already charges higher tuition fees. It can now exploit its enhanced
market power, since it provides an even higher educational quality. Consequently,
the educational quality e¤ect drives up tuition fee t2 by more than t

1, and thus
widens the tuition fee di¤erential t. Formally, "q;p > 0 captures this e¤ect.
Secondly, there is a direct tax revenue e¤ect on tuition fees. Students become
more valuable because their expected tax payments in their host country increase
with the stay rate p. In response, the two countries face an incentive to lower their
tuition fees in order to attract more foreign students. This is particularly true for
country 2. Its opportunity costs of losing students in terms of foregone tax revenues
are particularly high because its students build up more human capital, and thus will
receive higher wages and pay more taxes than those in country 1. Hence, the direct
tax revenue e¤ect induces country 2 to cut its tuition fee by more than country 1.
This e¤ect reduces the tuition fee di¤erential. Formally, it is reected by "
;p < 0.
The opposing educational quality e¤ect and direct tax revenue e¤ect are already
su¢cient to conclude that the impact of a higher stay rate on tuition fees and the
tuition fee di¤erential is ambiguous. More specically, we nd that
dt
dp
R 0, "F;q Q
p + 3%
p + 2%
+
2 ( + %)
p + 2%  
=:  ; (16)
where "F;q := (@
2F=@q2)q=(@F=@q) stands for the elasticity of marginal xed costs.
Improving the quality of education is the more expensive, the greater is the elasticity
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"F;q. Hence, a high elasticity curbs the rise of educational quality q

2 in response to
an increase of the stay rate p. This in turn weakens the educational quality e¤ect. If
the elasticity "F;q exceeds the threshold level  , then the educational quality e¤ect
is so weak that the direct tax revenue e¤ect dominates. Under these circumstances,
the tuition fee di¤erential declines along with tuition fees. Otherwise, the tuition fee
di¤erential increases.
Allocation of Students In response to a higher stay rate, the high-quality coun-
try 2 raises its educational quality q2 further. This strengthens its market power in
the tuition fee competition. Country 2 exploits its improved position by grabbing a
larger share of the pool of talent, whose value to the host country has gone up. The
low-quality country 1 loses students. Formally, a decline in the ratio of the tuition
fee di¤erential to the quality di¤erential causes this shift in the allocation of students
in favour of country 2 and at the expense of country 1.
Further E¤ects in the General Case We now return to our more general setting
and consider a parameter % that can vary with the stay rate p (i.e., "%;p  0). In this
case, an expected income e¤ect emerges in addition to the aforementioned e¤ects.
Now, the expected net labour income increases with the stay rate (dEfwag=dp > 0).
This positive impact of an increase in the stay rate on labour income is greater, the
higher the educational quality. Thus, a rise in the stay rate reinforces the incentives
to study in the high-quality country 2, which has three implications.
Firstly, the demand for university places shifts in favour of country 2 for given
policies (q1; q2) and (t1; t2). Thus, the expected income e¤ect on demand reinforces
the decline in the ability threshold a^. Secondly, facing a growing demand, country
2 nds it even more benecial to invest in its educational quality. Thus, the expected
income e¤ect on educational quality reinforces the positive impact of the stay rate
on educational quality q2 and the quality di¤erential q
.
Thirdly, growing demand for university places in country 2 strengthens the in-
centives for country 2 to further raise its tuition fee for given quality levels (q1; q2).
This relaxes the pressure on country 1, which is now more likely to increase its
tuition fee too (note that the fees t1 and t

2 are strategic complements, as rivals
choices often are in the case of price competition), albeit to a lesser extent than
country 2. As the expected income e¤ect on tuition fees exhibits a stronger upward
pressure on t2 than on t

1, it fosters a larger regional gap in tuition fees. Formally,
"
;%"%;p > 0 captures this impact (see (14)). This direct e¤ect is even reinforced, as
the expected income e¤ect drives up the quality di¤erential, and thus strengthens
the educational quality e¤ect on tuition fees. Again, this mechanism raises tuition
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fees and the tuition fee di¤erential. However, the overall e¤ect of the stay rate on
tuition fees and the tuition fee di¤erential remains ambiguous.
All in all, the conclusions in the more general setting are qualitatively the same
as in the special case. In particular, the educational quality q2 and the quality
di¤erential on the one hand and the tuition fees and the tuition fee di¤erential on
the other hand can move in opposite directions, as stated in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 If the direct tax revenue e¤ect on tuition fees is su¢ciently strong,
then an increase in the stay rate of foreign students after graduation widens the
educational quality gap (i.e., dq=dp > 0), while the tuition fees of the two coun-
tries converge (i.e., dt=dp < 0). Also, both tuition fees t1 and t

2 fall, whereas
educational quality q2 increases.
In the special case, this outcome occurs if the elasticity condition "F;q >   holds.
For example, the xed cost function F (q) = q,  > 1, fulls this elasticity condition
as long as the parameter  is su¢ciently large. Also, if the tuition fee di¤erential
declines, then the tuition fees do so, too.11
4.2 Income in ROW
A feature of the present framework is that students can earn higher net wages in
their host countries than in their home countries. This feature reects the fact that
the host countries represent developed countries, while ROW stands for developing
regions. In this section, we consider the impact of the ROWs catching up with the
developed countries in terms of graduate income, as we observe in the case of, e.g.,
China or India. Analytically, we capture this narrowing wage gap between developed
and less developed countries by a marginal increase in . The following proposition
summarises the resulting comparative statics.
Proposition 2 An increase in the graduate income in the home countries of the
students
(i) raises the educational quality q2 (i.e., dq

2=d > 0), but it does not a¤ect the
educational quality q1 = 0 (thus, dq
=d > 0);
(ii) raises the tuition fees t1 and t

2 and the tuition fee di¤erential t
 (i.e.,
dti =d > 0 and dt
=d > 0);
11From (8) and (9) follows that t
2
= 2t
1
+ pw. Then, d (t
2
  t
1
) =dp = dt
1
=dp + w =
0:5 (dt
2
=dp+ w), and thus d (t
2
  t
1
) =dp < 0 implies both dt
1
=dp < 0 and dt
2
=dp < 0.
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(iii) has an ambiguous e¤ect on the share of foreign students who study in the
high-quality country:
d(1  a^)
d
R 0 , 3  p T 0. (17)
A growing graduate income in ROW increases the expected net labour income.
Again, this positive impact on wages is larger, the higher the educational quality.
Thus, a rise in the wage parameter  reinforces individual incentives to study in the
high-quality country 2. This expected income e¤ect is the same in qualitative terms
as the one discussed in the general case of section 4.1, and so are the implications.
Firstly, the demand for university places in the high-quality country rises for
given policies (q1; q2) and (t1; t2). Secondly, as students become more inclined to
study in the high-quality country, the government of country 2 benets even more
from investing in its educational quality (i.e., [@2W 2 = (@q

2@%)] @%=@ > 0). Again,
the educational quality q2 and the quality di¤erential q
 increase. (Needless to
say, the quality q1 = 0 is again not a¤ected, for reasons already explained above.)
Thirdly, the expected income e¤ect directly pushes up tuition fees and the tuition
fee di¤erential, as discussed in section 4.1. This e¤ect is again reinforced by the
educational quality e¤ect on tuition fees, as the quality di¤erential widens.
Note that the ambiguity about the changes in tuition fees in proposition 1 is
caused by the direct tax revenue e¤ect on tuition fees, which works in favour of
lower and converging fees. But exactly this e¤ect does not have a counterpart in
the current context. Therefore, proposition 2 provides an unambiguous result about
tuition fees.
By contrast, the conclusion about the share of students in the high-quality coun-
try is no longer clear-cut. Without the direct tax revenue e¤ect on tuition fees, there
is no force that counteracts the rise in tuition fees and the tuition fee di¤erential
in response to a larger value of . Hence, the surge in the tuition fee di¤erential,
which drives students to the low-quality country, can be so drastic that it more than
compensates for the rise in  and the induced increase in the quality di¤erential,
which pushes students to the high-quality country. Then, the share of students in
the high-quality country falls in equilibrium. Otherwise, this share rises.
4.3 Size of the Pool of Talent
In the light of increasing international student mobility, we nally analyse how an
enlarged pool of international talent a¤ects the subgame-perfect policies and the
allocation of students.
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Proposition 3 An increase in the size of the international pool of talent
(i) raises the educational quality q2 (i.e., dq

2=dN > 0), but does not a¤ect the
quality q1 = 0 (thus, dq
=dN > 0);
(ii) raises the tuition fees t1 and t

2 and the tuition fee di¤erential t
 (i.e.,
dti =dN > 0 and dt
=dN > 0);
(iii) has no impact on the share of students who study in the high-quality country
(i.e., d(1  a^)=dN = 0).
Firstly, there is a direct demand e¤ect on the educational quality. A larger inter-
national student population raises the marginal variable rent of a quality increase
in the high-quality country 2. That is, d2r2=dq2dN > 0 (see (13)). As the xed costs
of quality improvements remain the same and are now divided over a greater num-
ber of students, investing in educational quality becomes more benecial in country
2. Consequently, country 2 increases its educational quality q2. Its opponent again
leaves its quality level at q1 = 0, for the same reasons as discussed above. Thus, the
quality di¤erential between the two countries increases.
Secondly, there is the educational quality e¤ect on tuition fees. Again, a widening
quality gap weakens tuition fee competition and enables both countries to charge
higher fees, and leads to a larger tuition fee di¤erential, as discussed above. Finally,
as there is neither the direct tax revenue e¤ect nor the expected income e¤ect at
work in the present scenario, each countrys share of the international talent pool
remains unchanged. Without the expected income e¤ect, an increase in the size of
the talent pool a¤ects the allocation of students only indirectly through changes in
policies. However, without the direct tax revenue e¤ect, the ratio of the tuition fee
di¤erential to the educational quality di¤erential (i.e., 
) remains unaltered, and
thus the allocation of students (see (10)).
4.4 Robustness and Other Forms of Competition
Table 1 summarises the impact of the socio-economic changes analysed above. In all
three scenarios, the educational quality q2 increases and, along with it, the quality
di¤erential. The tuition fee di¤erential and tuition fees may decline in response to a
larger stay rate, but will certainly increase if the income in ROW or the size of the
international pool of talent grows. Finally, the share of foreign students may decline,
as the income in ROW grows, but will denitely increase if the stay rate goes up,
and will remain una¤ected by changes in the size of the pool of talent.
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Education quality Tuition fees Student allocation
Increase of ...
... stay rate (p ") q2 ", q

1 = 0, change of t

i and a^
 #
q " t ambiguous
... ROW income ( ") q2 ", q

1 = 0, t

i ", t
 " change of a^
q " ambiguous
... size of talent pool (N ") q2 ", q

1 = 0, t

i ", t
 " a^ unchanged
q "
Table 1: Summary of comparative statics e¤ects.
Our model is obviously a variation of the class of models with vertical product
di¤erentiation in the spirit of the seminal papers by, for instance, Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982). In contrast to the applications of this
model type in industrial economics, however, our competitors are not rms which
only focus on their private benets but entities whose objective functions include
public benets.12 To better understand how tax revenues as a component of the
objective function a¤ect our conclusions, we now briey sketch the competition
between two universities which consider international students only as an additional
income source and simply maximise the revenues from tuition fees net of education
costs, i.e., RPi = Ni[ti   c(qi)]   F (qi), perhaps to subsidise research. We refer to
this case, which is as close as possible to that in traditional models of industrial
economics, as private competition, as public benets are not taken into account,
and denote it by the superscript P .
If universities ignore the scal externalities of foreign students, they are less
incentivised to invest in their students human capital to attract students in the
rst place. As a result, the educational quality q2 and the quality di¤erential q are
lower, while the tuition fees of both universities t1 and t2 might still be higher under
private competition than under public competition. More interestingly, replacing
public with private competition a¤ects several of our comparative statics results.
Consider the impact of a change in the stay rate, as summarised in proposition
1. Under private competition, the direct tax revenue e¤ect on quality q2, which is
explored in section 4.1, does not occur any more, since the private universities do
12Another application of this type of model to public economics is Zissimos and Wooders (2008),
who analyse tax competition.
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not pay attention to the fact that a higher stay rate p raises the positive impact of
educational quality on future tax payments. By contrast, the expected income e¤ect
on educational quality is still at work. That is, as a higher stay rate increases the
students expected income gains from educational quality, and thus raises their will-
ingness to pay for quality, the high-quality university improves its quality. However,
this positive expected income e¤ect also vanishes in the special case with ROW = 
and  = 1, as discussed in section 4.1. Thus, while educational quality qP2 still tends
to increase with the stay rate p, this positive relationship is somewhat weaker than
under public competition. In particular, an increase in the stay rate p has no e¤ect
at all on quality qP2 in the special case with ROW =  and  = 1.
A higher expected income as a result of a higher stay rate directly and indirectly
(through its impact on educational quality) drives up tuition fees and the tuition
fee di¤erential, as analysed in section 4.1. Under public competition, the expected
income and educational quality e¤ects on tuition fees are counteracted by the direct
tax revenue e¤ect, i.e., public universities will face an incentive to lower their tuition
fees if international graduates are more likely to stay on in their host country as tax
payers. In the case of private universities, the direct tax revenue e¤ect does obviously
not occur, and we are left with the two other e¤ects. Consequently, and unlike the
result in proposition 1, the tuition fees tP1 and t
P
2 and the tuition fee di¤erential t
P
weakly increase with the stay rate p. As an immediate implication, corollary 1 does
not hold true any more.
These di¤erences between public and private competition still arise when we
apply a more general and realistic model of competition between private universities
in which private universities receive a prestige benet from well-educated alumni and
potentially provide a higher educational quality than public universities would do.
We show this result and how private competition changes our other propositions in
an additional appendix.
In this additional appendix B, we also analyse the case of domestic competition
between a public and a private university. This further form of competition is im-
portant because many international students might have regional preferences and
favour studying in one country over doing so in another. In this case, universities
within a country are in ercer competition with each other than universities in dif-
ferent countries, and some of these domestic universities might be public institutions
while others might be private ones. Surprisingly, our propositions and the corollary
prove to be fairly robust with respect to replacing international with domestic com-
petition. In particular, it turns out that all our propositions and the corollary are
still valid if the public university provides a high educational quality.
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To summarise, the fact that we consider public, or publicly controlled, univer-
sities and assume that the decisions on educational quality and tuition fees take
account of the wider scal implications strongly drives key conclusions. By contrast,
the focus on international competition rather than domestic one seems to be far less
important for these conclusions.
5 Brain Drain and Brain Gain
Having explored how a changing environment a¤ects educational quality, tuition
fees and the allocation of students under various circumstances, we now explore
whether, from the perspective of the developing countries, the socio-economic
changes analysed in the previous sections yield a brain drain or a brain gain. The
ndings in the previous sections shed some light on this question and explore novel
mechanisms that generate brain drain or brain gain in the context of international
competition for students.13 In the following, we focus on two scenarios, a rise in the
stay rate and an increase in the size of the talent pool.
Stay Rate First of all, an increase in the stay rate p reduces the number of inter-
nationally educated graduates who return to ROW, which constitutes a quantitative
brain drain. At the same time, an increase in the stay rate alters the competition
for international students, with clear-cut implications. Firstly, a larger share of the
talent pool is educated in the high-quality country 2 (i.e., d(1 a^)=dp > 0). Secondly,
the educational quality in country 2 increases, while the quality in country 1 remains
unchanged. Both e¤ects push up the average human capital of graduates who return
to ROW, which constitutes a qualitative brain gain.14 Overall, ROW su¤ers from a
quantitative brain drain, but it benets from a qualitative brain gain.
Size of the Talent Pool For a given return rate (1   p), the number of inter-
nationally educated graduates in ROW apparently increases with the number of
13The conclusions in this section are not only valid for public competition, but qualitatively also
for the alternative forms of competition discussed in section 4.4.
14Haupt et al. (2014) argue that aggregate and per-capita human capital in a developing country
increases with the stay rate of international students in a developed host country as long as this stay
rate is not too large. In their model, however, there is only one host country, o¤ering a uniform
education quality. That is, Haupt et al. (2014) ignore the implications of competition between
universities.
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students sent abroad, N . This increase constitutes a quantitative brain gain. (More-
over, this will certainly lead to a per-capita brain gain if the increase in the number
of international students N results from a rising student share of the population in
ROW, and not merely from population growth.)
In addition, a rise in the number of international students N alters the com-
petition for ROW-born students. The educational quality q2 increases, while the
educational quality q1 = 0 remains unchanged. The allocation of students within
the host regions stays the same as well. Consequently, the average human capital of
the returning graduates increases, implying a qualitative brain gain. Overall, ROW
benets from both a quantitative and qualitative brain gain.
The novelty of these brain gain and brain drain e¤ects is that they are driven by
university competition and policy changes in the developed countries. By contrast,
the standard economic literature on brain drain and brain gain stresses how migra-
tion shapes private incentives to invest in education, as, e.g., in Stark et al. (1998)
and Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003). In this sense, our model complements the
existing literature on brain drain and brain gain by explicitly considering the host
countries competition for talent from developing countries.
6 Domestic Students
In the previous sections, we focused on international students, therefore abstract-
ing from domestic ones. We now include domestic students in our analysis. Even in
the presence of domestic students, many university initiatives aim at specically en-
hancing the educational quality that international students experience (e.g., through
providing additional supervision, tutorials and language courses for international
students). If this were solely the case, including domestic students into our model
would leave our conclusions unaltered. Beyond these specic investments, however,
there are also many investments in general educational quality, i.e., quality that
benets both domestic and foreign students. Let us now investigate whether our pre-
vious conclusions remain valid in the presence of domestic students and investments
in general educational quality.
To tackle this issue, we extend our basic model by explicitly including domestic
students. We assume that each country has a given pool of domestic talent D. These
students are internationally immobile and are characterised by the same uniform
ability distribution as foreign students. We ignore specic educational quality and
instead focus on general educational quality only, which is the same for domestic and
foreign students in each country and denoted by qDi . In line with the practice in many
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countries, we assume that countries can di¤erentiate the tuition fees for domestic
and foreign students, with ti still denoting those for international students.
15 After
graduation, immobile domestic students stay in their home country and earn wage
w = w + aqi, as do the foreign graduates who remain in their host country.
Each government acts benevolent towards the domestic pool of talent, and the
welfare function of country i now includes the aggregate wage income of its natives
net of their variable education costs, denoted by Vi, in addition to the components
of the old objective function (2):
RDi = Vi + Wi +Ni[ti   c(q
D
i )]  F (q
D
i ), (18)
where Vi = Di

(w + 1
2
qDi )  q
D
i

if all natives attend university. We suppose that
this is the case to simplify the presentation without a¤ecting our conclusions qual-
itatively and show in appendix B under which conditions this situation emerges.
Note that neither tuition fees nor taxes paid by natives appear in this welfare func-
tion. Since these fees and taxes increase public revenues by the same amount as they
reduce aggregate income of natives, they are welfare-neutral. Also, we normalise the
wage of a non-graduate to zero.
The threshold value (3) still characterises the demand of the international pool
of talent for the two universities. Also, the new term Vi of welfare function (18) does
not contain the tuition fee ti, which is paid by international students, whereas the
old welfare terms Wi, Ni[ti c(q
D
i )] and F (q
D
i ) are not a¤ected by the introduction
of domestic students other than the fact that all students face the same quality level
qDi . Consequently, tuition fee competition for the international pool of talent leads to
the same resultsstated in (8), (9), (10) and (11)as in the case without domestic
students. (Appendix B contains the mathematical details of this section.)
Turning to educational quality competition, we again follow the line of reasoning
in section 3. The quality levels are implicitly determined by the conditions
@RD1
@qD1
= D

1
2
  

| {z }
income e¤ect
 
1
2
a^2N(p + 2%)| {z }
competition e¤ect
 
@F
@qD1
 0, (19)
which may, or may not, give an interior solution for qD1 , as discussed shortly, and
@RD2
@qD2
= D

1
2
  

| {z }
income e¤ect
+
1
2
(1  a^)2N(p + 2%)| {z }
competition e¤ect
 
@F
@qD2
= 0. (20)
15For instance, 16 out of 27 OECD member countries examined in OECD (2014: 348) charge
higher tuition fees from international students than from domestic ones.
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The rst term of the two derivatives captures the income gain of the natives from
an increase in educational quality. This new e¤ect is positive for  < 1=2, which
we assume to be the case. The other terms of the derivatives reect the impact of
educational quality on the contribution of international students to domestic welfare
and on the xed costs of education. They are identical to those in (12) and (13).
Comparing the conditions (19) and (20) with (12) and (13) reveals two di¤er-
ences between the scenarios with and without domestic students. Firstly, educational
quality in the low-quality country will be positive if the cohort of domestic students
D is large relative to that of international students N . On the one hand, a lower
quality softens tuition fee competition (competition e¤ect), as explained in section 3.
On the other hand, a higher quality increases the future income of domestic students
(native income e¤ect). If D is su¢ciently large relative to N , the latter e¤ect is so
strong that an interior solution results, i.e., @RD1 =@q
D
1 = 0 for q1 > 0. Otherwise,
qD1 = 0 holds, as in section 3. Secondly, the educational quality in the high-quality
country 2 is higher in the presence of both domestic and international talent than
in the absence of either domestic or international students. Both the native income
and the competition e¤ect work in the same direction. To put it di¤erently, with-
out foreign talent (i.e., N = 0), both governments would prefer the same positive
level of educational quality. Take this level as the benchmark. Then, competition
for international students lets governments di¤erentiate educational quality around
this benchmark level. Thus, the presence of an international pool of talent has qual-
itatively the same e¤ect as before, but this e¤ect is softened by the existence of
domestic students.
We can now deal with the remaining question of whether, and how, including
domestic students a¤ects the way changes in the socio-economic environment shape
international competition. Importantly, if qD1 = q

1 = 0 resulted, propositions 1 to 3
and corollary 1 would hold true in the extended model without qualication. Thus,
we focus instead on the scenario with a positive educational quality (qD1 > 0).
Socioeconomic Changes As the threshold level a^, and thus the allocation of
international students, is still given by (11), the share of foreign students who study
in the high-quality country (1  a^) still increases with the stay rate p.
By contrast, the stay rate now has an ambiguous impact on educational quality
qD1 (assuming that q
D
1 > 0). As the income e¤ect is independent of the stay rate,
parameter p a¤ects educational quality only through its inuence on the competition
e¤ect (see (19)). On the one hand, foreign students become more important for
country 1 when the stay rate increases, since it makes them more likely to work in
their host country after graduation and pay taxes. On the other hand, they become
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less important for country 1, since demand shifts from low-quality to high-quality
education, reecting the fact that a higher stay rate increases the income gains from
educational quality. If the former direct e¤ect dominates (is dominated by) the latter
indirect e¤ect, then country 1 competes more (less) ercely for the international pool
of talent. It then faces a bigger (smaller) incentive to di¤erentiate its educational
quality to soften tuition fee competition, and thus reduces (increases) its quality
level qD1 .
The quality level qD2 still increases with the stay rate p. The income e¤ect changes
the quality level qD2 but not the impact of p on the educational quality level q
D
2 , i.e.,
dqD2 =dp is una¤ected and still positive. Importantly, both the direct e¤ect and the
indirect e¤ect discussed above work in favour of a higher quality qD2 (see (20)).
As the quality qD1 might increase with the stay rate p, the impact of the stay rate
on the quality di¤erential qD := qD2  q
D
1 is a priori unclear. The quality di¤erential
declines if there is a drastic rise in educational quality qD1 relative to quality q
D
2 . Such
an outcome requires that the positive indirect e¤ect of a higher stay rate on quality
qD1 is su¢ciently strong relative to that on quality q
D
2 . This in turn tends to be
the case if the cost parameter  is su¢ciently large, which particularly curbs the
incentives of the high-quality country to invest in its educational quality. For a small
cost parameter , by contrast, the quality di¤erential tends to increase with the stay
rate and all our conclusions in section 4.1 tend to carry over to this model extension
(see appendix B for further details).
Finally, the impact of the stay rate on tuition fees remains ambiguous just like
in the case without domestic students. As discussed in detail in section 4.1, a higher
stay rate gives rise to opposing e¤ects on the tuition fee di¤erential even if we
ignore domestic students, with the educational quality e¤ect and the expected income
e¤ect counteracting the direct tax revenue e¤ect. With domestic students, the quality
di¤erential might narrow and thus reverse the sign of the educational quality e¤ect,
further adding to the already existing ambiguity.
In summary, our new ndings are in line with the conclusions in proposition 1
and corollary 1 if the indirect e¤ect of a higher stay rate on quality qD1 is not too
strong. However, including domestic students into our model adds two important
qualications to the comparative statics results in section 4.1. Firstly, the quality
level qD1 can now vary with the stay rate and, secondly, a higher stay rate can narrow
the quality di¤erential, at least for a large cost parameter . Our extension does not
qualitatively a¤ect the other conclusions in proposition 1 and corollary 1.
Considering the e¤ects of a higher income in ROW, we nd a similar picture.
Our conclusions in proposition 2 carry over to the case with domestic students for
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small variable education costs, but need some qualications for large ones. Finally,
an increase of the pool of international talent N qualitatively brings about (almost)
identical results in the scenarios with and without domestic students (see appendix
B for further details).
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analysed the competition between two developed countries
for the pool of students from the developing world. In particular, we have been in-
terested in how potential trends in developed and developing countries a¤ect the
equilibrium outcome. In this context, a further interesting question is how tax and
education policies interact, and how asymmetries in the tax rates a¤ect the equilib-
rium outcome. If there is a decline in the tax rate in, say, country 2, this country
becomes more attractive to foreign students, and demand for higher education shifts
in its favour. As a result, we expect tuition fees to rise in this country, simply re-
ecting the fact that income tax and tuition fees are imperfect substitutes. The
impact of a lower tax rate on educational quality is less clear. On the one hand,
the incentive to invest in quality is depressed, as those graduates who continue to
stay in country 2 pay lower taxes and are thus less valuable for country 2. On the
other hand, this incentive is reinforced, as students pay higher tuition fees and are
thus more valuable. Whether the positive or negative impact on quality dominates
should depend on the importance of taxes as revenue source relative to tuition fees,
which hinges on the stay rate and the level of taxes and tuition fees.
This short discussion about the interaction between education and tax policies
gives rise to the question whether governments could come up with smarter schemes
than the ones considered in this paper. In our model, tuition fees can easily be nega-
tive. That is, governments might e¤ectively grant scholarships, which are somewhat
repaid by future tax payments. However, as all international students pay tuition
fees, but only some of them will pay taxes in their host countries, governments
might be tempted to erase such scholarships and charge positive tuition fees, but
give tax credits to those international students who stay on in their host country
after graduation. Such a scheme could be interpreted as a reversed graduate tax.
However, this idea might not be advisable in a more complex environment in
which international students are credit constrained and face uncertainty about their
future incomes, and in which the education outcome depends on unobservable study
e¤ort. In such an environment, tapping into the pool of talent abroad in a com-
petitive way might require to nancially support international students and insure
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them, like domestic students, to some extent against income risks, but at the same
time deal with the issue of moral hazard. Interestingly, Cigno and Luporini (2009)
show that, in this type of environment, a scholarship system nanced by a gradu-
ate tax can yield a rst-best allocation. Their policy suggestion is roughly in line
with the potential equilibrium outcome in our basic model, albeit for very di¤erent
reasons. However, Cigno and Luporini (2009) consider a closed economy in which
the government acts as benevolent principal towards its citizens. Thus, it is an open
issue whether their conclusions carry over to the case of international students and
its additional complications. We leave this question for future research.
Our analysis points to further interesting avenues for future research. For in-
stance, instead of the countries deciding simultaneously, they could make their qual-
ity, or market entry, choices sequentially (e.g., by launching international study
programmes). Countries would then have an incentive to spend resources to lead
the way and obtain a rst-mover advantage by choosing the more protable market
segment. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile considering an endogenous immigra-
tion policy which determines the stay rates of graduates. Countries could implement
some measures to foster social integration and to facilitate the labour market access
of graduates (e.g., by promoting permanent residency). More and more OECD coun-
tries already make use of this option, and it would be interesting to elaborate the
link between immigration policy and the competition for students in more detail.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
We start by deriving the equilibrium tuition fees (8) and (9). Country 1 chooses t1
to maximise net revenues R1 according to (6), taking t2 and quality levels (q1; q2)
as given. The corresponding rst-order condition for given q > 0 is, after some
rearrangements,
@R1
@t1
= N

@a^
@t1
[p (w + a^q1) + t1   q1] + a^

= 0, (21)
from which the best-response function t1 = t
br
1 (t2; q1; q2) can be derived:
t1 = 1t2 +
pw   c(q1)
pq1
%q
  2
; 1 :=
pq1
%q
  1
pq1
%q
  2
. (22)
Using (7), we can analogously determine the rst-order condition for the tuition
fee chosen by country 2 and the best-response function t2 = t
br
2 (t1; q1; q2):
@R2
@t2
= N

 
@a^
@t2
[p (w + a^q2) + t2   q2] + (1  a^)

= 0, (23)
and
t2 = 2t1 +
%q + c(q2)  pw
pq2
%q
+ 2
; 2 :=
pq2
%q
+ 1
pq2
%q
+ 2
. (24)
Combining (22) and (24) yields equilibrium tuition fees
t1(q1; q2) =
1
1  12
"
pw   c(q1)
pq1
%q
  2
+ 1
%q + c(q2)  pw
pq2
%q
+ 2
#
; (25)
t2(q1; q2) =
1
1  12
"
2
pw   c(q1)
pq1
%q
  2
+
%q + c(q2)  pw
pq2
%q
+ 2
#
; (26)
which nally can be reduced to (8) and (9). These tuition fees are uniquely deter-
mined: As the best responses (22) and (24) are continuous functions of the op-
ponents tuition fee, and as the corresponding best-response curves have slopes
of 1  1=2 and 2 2 (1=2; 1), these curves intersect only once. The second-
order condition @2R2=@t
2
2 =  N (@a^=@t2) [p (@a^=@t2) q2 + 2] < 0 ,  pq2  
2%q < 0 is satised for all (q1; q2); the second-order conditions @
2R1=@t
2
1 =
N (@a^=@t1) [p (@a^=@t1) q1 + 2] < 0 is fullled for pq1   2%q < 0 , q2 >
[(p=2) + 1]q1. Under the latter condition, both second-order conditions are satis-
ed. Then, the second-stage equilibrium is unique and given by the tuition fees (8)
and (9) and the allocation of students (11). In particular, this is the case for the
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quality levels q2 > q

1 = 0 that follow from conditions (12) and (13) and for quality
levels in the larger neighbourhood of q2 and q

1. (We assume p+2%  > 0 to guar-
antee 0 < a^ < 1 and to exclude boundary solutions, which were not characterised
by (8) and (9) for q2 > q

1 = 0. This assumption underlies our arguments above.
Further details are provided on request.)
As the second-order condition d2R2=dq
2
2 =  @
2F=@q22 < 0 is fullled (see (13)),
the solution (t1(q

1; q

2); t

2(q

1; q

2); q

1; q

2; a^
) constitutes a local equilibrium if we can
additionally prove that both governments achieve positive net benets, i.e., Ri > 0
for q2 > q

1 = 0. First, we show that net variable rents ri(q1; q2) = Wi + Ni[ti  
c(qi)] > 0 are strictly positive. Inserting equilibrium values t

1, t

2 and a^
, which are
dened by (8), (9) and (11), in the net variable rents (see the corresponding terms
in (6) and (7)) yields, after some rearrangements,
r1(q1; q2) = N

 + %
p + 3%

 (2%q   pq1) +  (4%q   pq1)
2 (p + 3)

; (27)
r2(q1; q2) = N

p + 2%  
p + 3%

(p + 2%  ) (2%q + pq2)
2 (p + 3%)

, (28)
which not only shows that net variable rents r1 and r2 decline with quality q1, but
more importantly that
r1(q1; q2) > 0 if pq1   2%q < 0; (29)
r2(q1; q2) > 0 if
p
2
q2 + %q

(p + 2%  ) > 0: (30)
Thus, net variable rent r1(q1; q2) is strictly positive if the second-order condition
@2R1=@t
2
1 < 0 , pq1   2%q < 0 is satised, which is the case for q

2 > q

1 = 0.
Similarly, net variable rent r2(q1; q2) is strictly positive, as we assume p+2%  > 0
(which guarantees that a^ < 1). With q2 > q

1 = 0, country 1 generates a strictly
positive benet R1 > 0 (see (6)) because F (0) = 0 and r1(q

1; q

2) > 0.
Country 2 also generates a strictly positive rent R2, as limq2!0R2(0; q2) = 0
implies q2 = argmaxR2(q2) > 0, R2(q

2) > 0.
The equilibrium allocation of students is a^. From (3) follows that all individuals
with ability a  a^ study in the high-quality country 2, while all students with
a < a^ study in country 1.
Proof of Non-existence of Symmetric Equilibrium
To show that a symmetric solution cannot exist, we rst analyse tuition fee com-
petition, assuming that the two countries chose identical educational qualities
q1 = q2 =: q in the rst stage. Assume that students who are indi¤erent between
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the two countries study in each of the two countries with probability 0:5. For undif-
ferentiated quality levels, the variable net rent then amounts to
rijq=0 =
8>>><
>>>:
W +N(ti   c(q)) if ti < tj;
1
2
[W +N(ti   c(q))] if ti = tj;
0 if ti > tj;
(31)
where W = pN
R 1
0
(w + aq)da = pN(w + q=2). The xed costs of providing quality
are already sunk and therefore irrelevant for tuition fee competition. Countries have
an incentive to undercut their competitor in order to attract all foreign students as
long as ri is positive, thereby engaging in a race-to-the-bottom leading to tuition
fees t1 = t2 = q   p(w + q=2) and ri = 0.
This result of the second stage a¤ects, in turn, the overall rent Ri after taking
quality competition into account. If the variable net rent in (6) and (7) is zero,
only the xed costs remain, i.e., Ri =  F (q), i = 1; 2. Then educational qualities
q1 = q2 > 0 cannot constitute an equilibrium. One country could unilaterally deviate
and choose, for instance, an educational quality of zero, thereby reducing xed costs
F (q) to zero, while the ensuing tuition fee competition would lead to positive net
variable revenues according to (27). Thus, net benets of this country would rise
from  F (q) to a positive value.
Next, the solution q1 = q2 = 0, implying R1 = R2 = 0, cannot be an equilibrium
either. The reason is that one country, say country 2, can then gain from unilaterally
raising its quality to q2 and realising positive net revenues R2 > 0, as explored in
the proof of lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
First of all, note that
@%(p)
@p
= (1  )  (1  ROW )  0 (32)
can be signed unambiguously by Assumption 1. This nding can be used to get,
from (1) and (11),
da^
dp
=  
 [(1  ROW ) + ] + 3
@%
@p
(p + 3%)2
< 0, (33)
and thus @(1  a^)=@p > 0. This proves part (iii) of proposition 1.
Now, part (i) follows from
dq
dp
T 0 (q

1
=0)
,
dq2
dp
=  
d2R2= (dq2dp)
d2R2=dq22
T 0 (34)
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(13)
,
d2R2
dq2dp
=
d

N
2
(p + 2%)(1  a^)2

dp
T 0: (35)
Further, we can show that
d2R2
dq2dp
=
N(1  a^)
2

( + 2
@%
@p
)(1  a^)  2(p + 2%)
@a^
@p

> 0, (36)
where the last inequality results from @%=@p  0 (see (32)), @a^=@p < 0 (see (33))
and 1   a^ > 0. That means that from (36) follows that the sign of dq=dp is
positive. Thus, dq2=dp > 0 also results, as q

1 = 0 irrespective of p.
Considering the tuition fee di¤erential (10), we get
dt
dp
= 

dq
dp
+q

d

dp
+
@

@%
@%
@p

(37)
= 

q
p
8>>><
>>>:
dq
dp
p
q| {z }
:="q;p>0
+
@

@p
p

| {z }
:="
;p<0
+
@

@%
%

| {z }
:="
;%>0

@%
@p
p
%|{z}
:="%;p0
9>>>=
>>>; , (38)
where "q;p := (dq=dp)(p=q) > 0, "
;p := (@
=@p)(p=
) < 0, and "%;p :=
(@%=@p)(p=%)  0 follow directly from (34)-(36), (10), and (32). Furthermore,
"
;% = (@
=@%)(%=
) > 0 results from
@

@%
=
p ( + 2%) + 3%2
(p + 3%)2
> 0. (39)
The derivative (38) directly implies (14), which is stated in part (ii) of proposition
1. Furthermore, for q1 = 0, we get t

2 = 2t

1 + pw and t

1 = (1=2)(t

2   pw) (see
(8) and (9)), leading to t = t2   t

1 = t

1 + pw = (1=2)(t

2 + pw) and thus
dt=dp = dt1=dp+w = (1=2)(dt

2=dp+w). Then, dt
=dp < 0 implies dt1=dp < 0
and dt2=dp < 0. However, dt

1=dp > 0 or dt

2=dp > 0 is possible if dt
=dp > 0. To
summarise, the impact of the stay rate p on the tuition fee di¤erential and the tuition
fees tP1 and t
P
2 is ambiguous.
Proof of Proposition 2
Part (i) of proposition 2 follows from
dq
d
T 0 (q

1
=0)
,
dq2
d
=  
d2R2= (dqd)
d2R2=dq22
T 0 (40)
(13)
,
d2R2
dqd
=
d

N
2
(p + 2%)(1  a^)2

d%
d%
d
T 0 (41)
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and, using (11) and the fact that d%=d = (1  p) (1  ROW ) > 0 (see (1)),
d2R2
dqd
> 0 , 3%p + 6%2 + 2p + 3% > 0, (42)
where the last inequality always holds. Thus, dq=dp > 0, implying dq2=dp > 0
because q1 = 0 irrespective of p.
Using (10), part (ii) of proposition 2 follows from
dt
d
=
@t
@%

@%
@
+
@t
@q

dq
d
> 0; (43)
where @t=@q = 
(p; %) > 0 (see (10)), dq=d > 0 (see (40)-(42)), @%=@ =
(1  p)(1  ROW ) > 0 (see (1)), and
@t
@%
=
p( + 2%) + 3%2
(p + 3%)2
q > 0 (44)
(see (10) and (39)). Moreover, dt=d > 0 implies dt1=d > 0 and dt

2=d > 0,
since t = t2   t

1 = t

1 + pw = (1=2)(t

2 + pw) (see proof of proposition 1) and
thus dt=d = dt1=d = (1=2)dt

2=d.
Also, using (1) and (11) yields
d(1  a^)
d
T 0 ,  @a^

d%
@%
@
T 0 , 3  p T 0, (45)
which proves part (iii) of proposition 2.
Proof Proposition 3
Applying comparative statics again yields
@q
@N
T 0 (q

1
=0)
,
@q2
@N
T 0 (13), @
@N

N
2
(p + 2%)(1  a^)2

T 0, (46)
with
@
@N

N
2
(p + 2%)(1  a^)2

=
1
2
(p + 2%)(1  a^)2 > 0. (47)
Thus, dq=dN > 0 and, as q1 = 0 irrespective of p, dq

2=dN > 0, as stated in part
(i) of proposition 3.
Part (ii) follows from
dt
dN
=
@t
@q

@q
@N
> 0, (48)
where @t=@q = 
(p; %) > 0 (see (10)) and @q=@N > 0 (see (46) and (47)).
In line with our previous reasoning, dt=dN > 0 implies dti =dN > 0, since t
 =
t2   t

1 = t

1 + pw = (1=2)(t

2 + pw) and thus dt
=dN = dt1=dN = (1=2)dt

2=dN .
Part (iii) follows directly from (11), as a^ is independent of N .
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Appendix B
B.1 Competition between Private Universities (Section 4.4)
Let us start by analysing the competition between two private universities for the
international pool of talent. As indicated in the paper, we explore a slightly more
general model in this appendix than the one informally discussed in section 4.4 of the
paper. As in this section of the paper, the private universities are not interested in
how their decisions a¤ect future tax payments, but in contrast to this section, they
now receive a prestige benet from well-educated alumni. This additional benet
enters their objective function
RPi = Ai +Ni[ti   c(qi)]  F (qi), (49)
where   0 captures the weight assigned to the prestige benet, Ai stands for the
aggregate human capital generated by university i, and the superscript P indicates
the scenario with private competition. In the paper, we discuss the special case of
 = 0. As we will see, considering the more general case of   0 does not alter the
results informally discussed in the paper.
Quality and Tuition Fee Competition Revisited 1
The threshold value (3) still characterises the demand of the international students
for the two universities. Thus, the two universities generate human capital A1 =
N
R a^
0
aq1da =
1
2
a^2q1N and A2 = N
R 1
a^
aq2da =
1
2
(1  a^2) q2N , respectively. Using
these terms to rearrange objective function (49) yields
RP1 = a^N

1
2
a^q1 + t1   c(q1)

  F (q1), (50)
RP2 = (1  a^)N

1
2
 (1 + a^) q2 + t2   c(q2)

  F (q2). (51)
The di¤erences between these objective functions and their counterparts (6) and
(7) are that the tax revenue term p is replaced with the prestige term , and that
the wage component w is not included (as future tax revenues are now not taken
into account). These di¤erences will become important when we discuss the im-
pact of changes in the socio-economic environment on education policy and student
allocation.
First, we analyse the tuition fee competition in the second stage under the new
circumstances. The universities choose their tuition fees t1 and t2, respectively, to
maximise their objectives RP1 and R
P
2 , taking the quality levels (q1; q2) and their
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rivals tuition fee as given. Using threshold value (3) and di¤erentiating objective
functions (50) and (51), we get
dRP1
dt1
= N

da^
dt1
(a^q1 + t1   q1) + a^

= 0, tP1 = a^%(q2   q1)  a^q1 + q1 (52)
and
dRP2
dt2
= N

 
da^
dt2
(a^q2 + t2   q2) + (1  a^)

= 0
, tP2 = (1  a^)%(q2   q1)  a^q2 + q2. (53)
Then, using equations (52) and (53) gives us the threshold level
a^P =
 + %
+ 3%
(54)
and the tuition fee di¤erential
tP (q) := tP2   t
P
1 = 

P (p; )q, where 
P (p; ) =
% ( + %)
+ 3%
. (55)
In the following, we assume  <  + 2 to guarantee a^P < 1. The corresponding
tuition fees are given by
tP1 (q1; q2) =
%[%q   q1 + (q2 + 2q1)]
+ 3%
, (56)
tP2 (q1; q2) =
%[2%q   q1 + (q1 + 2q2)]
+ 3%
. (57)
Second, we explore quality competition in the rst stage. Using the solutions
(54), (56) and (57), we get the derivative
dR1
dq1
= a^PN


2
a^P +
@tP1
@q1
  

 
@F
@q1
=  
N
2
(+ 2%)(a^P )2  
@F
@q1
< 0, (58)
which implies qP1 = 0, and the rst-order condition
dR2
dq2
= (1  a^P )N


2
(1 + a^P ) +
@tP2
@q2
  

 
@F
@q1
=
N
2
(+ 2%)(1  a^P )2  
@F
@q2
= 0, (59)
which implicitly determines the optimal quality level qP2 > 0.
In line with the solution in the case of the basic model, the threshold level (54),
the tuition fees (56) and (57), the rst-order condition (59) and the quality level
qP1 = 0 jointly characterise a local equilibrium with q
P
2 > q
P
1 = 0 and t
P
2 > t
P
1 . In
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this local equilibrium, the high-quality university attracts the brightest students,
i.e., those with a 2

a^P ; 1

, whereas the low-quality university takes the other stu-
dents (see lemma 1 in the paper for comparison). Note that when competition is
between private universities, the outcome is independent of whether the universities
are located in two di¤erent countries or the same country.
Comparing the corresponding local equilibria in the cases of private and public
competition reveals similarities and di¤erences. Firstly, the low-quality university
sets its quality level equal to zero in both cases for the very same reason. It di¤er-
entiates its quality level as much as possible from the quality level of its competitor
to soften tuition fee competition.
Secondly, the high educational quality is higher (lower) under private competition
than under public competition if and only if the prestige parameter  is greater
(smaller) than the average tax term p . Also, a higher (lower) quality q2 goes hand
in hand with a higher (lower) share of students who are enrolled at the high-quality
university. These conclusions follow from comparing the rst-order conditions (59)
and (13) and the threshold levels (54) and (11), which reveals that qP2 R q2 ,  R
p , 1  aP2 R 1  a2.
Thirdly, tuition fees and the tuition fee di¤erential can be greater or smaller
under private competition. However, if the high educational quality is the same
under private and public competition (i.e. if  = p), then the tuition fees of both
universities are higher under private competition than under public competition
while the tuition fee di¤erential is the same under the two forms of competition. This
conclusion follows from comparing tuition fees (8), (9), (56) and (57) and tuition fee
di¤erentials (10) and (55), which reveals that, for  = p , tPi = t

i + pw > t

i and
thus tPi = t

i .
In the special case of  = 0, which is discussed in the paper, the universities
assign no weight to the prestige benet and consider international students only
as an additional source of net revenues. Then, as private universities ignore the
scal externalities of international students, the education quality q2 and the quality
di¤erential q are denitely lower under private competition than under public
competition. The tuition fees of the two universities and the tuition fee di¤erential
might be higher or lower. In any case, fewer students are then enrolled at the high-
quality university.
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Competition in a Changing Environment Revisited 1
First, let us analyse how a marginal change in the stay rate p a¤ects the local
equilibrium. Di¤erentiating equilibrium threshold (54) gives
da^P
dp
=
@a^
@%
@%
@p
=
  3
(+ 3%)2
@%
@p|{z}
0
R 0 ,   3 R 0 if @%
@p
> 0 (60)
and thus @(1   a^P )=@p R 0 , 3    R 0 if @%=@p > 0, where d%=dp  0 follows
from (32). In contrast to the case of  = 0, which is discussed in the paper, and in
contrast to the case of public competition, the share (1   a^P ) of foreign students
who study at the high-quality university can even decline with the stay rate p if the
prestige parameter  is su¢ciently large.
Next, we show that quality qP2 and the quality di¤erential q
P increase with the
stay rate p. This conclusion follows from
dqP
dp
 0
(qP
1
=0)
,
dqP2
dp
=  
d2RP2 =dq
P
2 dp
d2R22=d(q
P
2 )
2
 0 , (61)
d2RP2
dqP2 dp
= (1  a^P )N
 
1  a^P
 @%
@p
  (+ 2%)
da^P
dp

= (1  a^P )N

3 (+ 2+ ) + 2
(+ 3)2

@%
@p
 0, (62)
where we used (59), (60) and @%=@p  0 (see (32)). For  = ROW and  = 1,
@%=@p = 0 results and the quality q2 does not alter in response to changes in the
stay rate q2. Obviously, quality q
P
1 = 0 is una¤ected by any socioeconomic changes.
Di¤erentiating the tuition fee di¤erential (55) with respect to the stay rate yields
dtP
dp
= 
P
dqP2
dp
+qP
@
P
@%
@%
@p
= 
P
qP2
p
8>>><
>>>:
dqP
dp
p
qP| {z }
=:"q;p0
+
@
P
@%
%

P| {z }
=:"

P ;p
>0

@%
@p
p
%|{z}
=:"%;p0
9>>>=
>>>;  0: (63)
where the last inequality follows from dqP2 =dp  0 (see (61)), @%=@p  0 (see (32))
and
@
P
@%
=
 ( + 2%) + 3%2
(+ 3%)2
> 0. (64)
Furthermore, for qP1 = 0, we get t
P
2 = 2t
P
1 , leading to t
P = tP2   t
P
1 = t
P
1 . Then,
dtP1 =dp = dt
P=dp  0 and, as tP2 = 2t
P
1 , dt
P
2 =dp = 2dt
P=dp  0. That is, the
tuition fees tP1 and t
P
2 and the tuition fee di¤erential increase with the stay rate p.
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Second, we analyse how a marginal rise in the income in the rest of the world,
i.e., a marginal rise in , a¤ects the local equilibrium. A marginal increase in the
ROW parameter  has an ambiguous e¤ect on the share (1   a^P ) of students who
study at the high-quality university:
da^P
d
=
@a^P
@%
@%
@
=
  3
(+ 3%)2
(1  p) (1  ROW ) R 0 ,   3 R 0 (65)
and thus @(1 a^P )=@p R 0, 3  R 0, where we used @%=@ = (1 p)(1 ROW ) >
0 (see (1)). However, in the special case of  = 0, a higher income in ROW leads to
a (weakly) higher share of students who are enrolled at the high-quality university.
Next, following the same line of reasoning as before, we can show that quality q2
and the quality di¤erential qP increase with the ROW income parameter . This
conclusion follows from
dqP
d
> 0
(qP
1
=0)
,
dqP2
d
=  
d2RP2 =dq
P
2 d
d2R22=d(q
P
2 )
2
> 0 , (66)
d2RP2
dqP2 d
= (1  a^P )N
 
1  a^P
 @%
@
  (+ 2%)
da^P
d

= (1  a^P )N

3 (+ 2+ ) + 2
(+ 3)2

@%
@
> 0, (67)
where we used (59), (65) and again @%=@ = (1  p)(1  ROW ) > 0 (see (1)).
Furthermore, the tuition fee di¤erential tP increases with the ROW income
parameter , since
dtP
d
= 
P
dqP2
d
+ qP2
@
P
@%
@%
@
> 0, (68)
where the last inequality follows from dqP2 =d > 0 (see (66)), @%=@ = (1   p)(1  
ROW ) > 0 (see (1)) and @

P=@% > 0 (see (64)). Using again tP2 = 2t
P
1 and thus
tP = tP1 , we can conclude that dt
P
2 =d = 2dt
P
1 =d = 2dt
P=d > 0. That is, the
tuition fees tP1 and t
P
2 also increase with the ROW income parameter .
Finally, we analyse how an increase in the size of the international pool of talent
a¤ects the local equilibrium. Inspection of (59) reveals that
dqP2
dN
> 0,
d2RP2
dqP2 dN
=
@
@N

N
2
(+ 2%)
 
1  a^P
2
=
1
2
(+ 2%)
 
1  a^P
2
> 0,
(69)
where the last inequality is obviously satised.
Furthermore, dqP2 =dN > 0 (see (69)), @t
P=@qP = 
P > 0 (see (55)) and
d
P=dN = 0 (see again (55)) imply that dtP=dN = (@tP=@qP )(dqP=dN) =
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P (dqP2 =dN) > 0. Using again t
P
2 = 2t
P
1 and thus t
P = tP1 , we get dt
P
2 =dN =
2dtP1 =dN = 2dt
P=dN > 0. Thus, the tuition fees tP1 and t
P
2 , the tuition fee dif-
ferential tP , the education quality qP2 and the quality di¤erential q
P all increase
with the cohort size parameter N . As (54) is independent of N , the allocation of
students, i.e., a^P , is una¤ected by changes in the size of the pool of talent.
B.2 Domestic Competition (Section 4.4)
As discussed in section 4.4 of the paper, many international students might have
regional preferences and prefer studying in one country over doing so in another
for a variety of reasons, including cultural preferences, language skills and personal
relationships. In this case, universities within a country are in ercer competition
with each other than universities in di¤erent countries. Also, public universities
compete with private universities in many countries, and governments nd it easier
to inuence decisions of public universities. We take up these issues by analysing now
domestic competition between a public university and a private one, assuming that
N international students intend to study in the country where the two universities
are located. While the government can control the education quality and tuition fee
of the public university, it has no sway over the decisions of the private university.
Otherwise, the universities compete in education quality and tuition fees as they
did in the previous sections. This analysis complements our preceding analysis of
international competition.
In principle, there are two possible equilibria, one in which the public university
provides a higher education quality and one in which the private university does so
(unless the objective functions of the two di¤erent universities are too asymmetric,
in which case only one of the two equilibria might exist). We focus now on the case in
which the quality of education is higher at the public university than at the private
rival. Adjusting the objective functions of the public and the private university to
this new setting, we obtain
RP1 = a^N [t1   c(q1)]  F (q1), (70)
RS2 = (1  a^)N

p

w +
1
2
(1 + a^) q2

+ t2   c(q2)

+ a^Np

w +
1
2
a^q1

  F (q2),
(71)
where the superscripts P and S stand for private and state (i.e., public). For
simplicity, we set  = 0, which reduces the objective function of the private university
to (70). Objective function (71) contains all expected tax revenues that will arise in
this country, irrespective of whether the tax payer graduated at the public or private
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university. However, it only includes the tuition fee revenues and education costs of
the public university. Thus, the government aims at maximising the contribution
of international students to the public budget (including the budget of the public
university).
Quality and Tuition Fee Competition Revisited 2
Let us again rst consider the tuition fee competition in the second stage, taking
into account that the threshold value (3) still determines the demand of the inter-
national pool of talent for the two universities. The universities set their tuition fees
simultaneously and non-cooperatively, leading to the rst-order conditions
@RP1
@t1
= N

@a^
@t1
(t1   q1) + a^

= 0 , tPS1 = %(q2   q1)a^+ q1; (72)
and
@RS2
@t2
= N

 
@a^
@t2
[p a^(q2   q1) + t2   q2] + (1  a^)

= 0
, tPS2 = [%(1  a^)  p a^] (q2   q1) + q2, (73)
where the superscript PS stands for variables in the case of domestic competition
between a private and a public (state) university. Inserting threshold value (3) into
(72) and (73) and rearranging the resulting terms yield the threshold level
a^PS =
 + %
p + 3%
, (74)
and the tuition fee di¤erential
tPS := tPS2   t
PS
1 = 

PS(p; )q, where 
PS(p; ) =
%( + %)
p + 3%
. (75)
The corresponding tuition fees are given by
tPS1 (q1; q2) =
%[%q + (q2 + 2q1)] + pq1
p + 3%
, (76)
tPS2 (q1; q2) =
%[2%q + (q1 + 2q2)] + pq1
p + 3%
. (77)
Second, we explore the quality competition in the rst stage. Using the solutions
(74), (76), and (77), we can calculate the derivatives
@RP1
@q1
= a^PSN

@tPS1
@q1
  

 
@F
@q1
=  N%(a^PS)2  
@F
@q1
< 0, (78)
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implying the optimal quality level qPS1 = 0, and
@RS2
@q2
= (1  a^PS)N

p
2
(1 + a^PS) +
@tPS2
@q2
  

 
@F
@q2
=
N
2
(p + 2%)(1  a^PS)2  
@F
@q2
= 0; (79)
implicitly determining the quality level qPS2 > 0.
Jointly, the threshold level (74), the tuition fees (76) and (77), the rst-order
condition (79) and the quality level qPS1 = 0 determine a local equilibrium with
qPS2 > q
PS
1 = 0 and t
PS
2 > t
PS
1 . In the scenario in which the public university
provides the high-quality education, it attracts the brightest students, i.e., those
with a 2

a^PS; 1

, whereas the private university takes the other students.
Comparing these equilibrium values with those in the case of international public
competition reveals astonishing similarities and a few di¤erences (see (8)-(13)). The
levels of education quality, the quality and tuition fee di¤erentials and the threshold
level a^PS are the same as the ones in the case of international public competition.
That is, qPS1 = q

1, q
PS
2 = q

2, q
PS = q, tPS = t and a^PS = a^. Both
tuition fees tPS1 and t
PS
2 exceed their counterparts t

1 and t

2 by pw. That is, t
PS
1 =
( + )qPS2

= (p + 3) = t1 + pw and t
PS
2 =

2( + )qPS2

= (p + 3) = t2 +
pw.
The intuition for this outcome is as follows: Compared to the situation under
international public competition, the negative e¤ects of raising the tuition fee of
the public university are cushioned. Now, students who switch from the public to
the private university to avoid such higher fees still stay in the country and end
up as domestic tax payers with probability p. Their tax payments will be lower if
the private university provides a lower education quality, but they will not vanish
altogether. As a result, the public university charges a higher tuition fee; and the
private university follows suit, since the private university (ignoring the scal benets
generated by international students) anyway tends to charge higher tuition fees, and
since tuition fees are strategic complements. This evenly increases the tuition fees
without a¤ecting the tuition fee di¤erential and the allocation of the students across
the two universities.
How does domestic competition change the incentive for the public university to
invest in education quality? On the one hand, attracting another student means that
this student pays pw more in tuition fees under domestic competition than under
international public competition. This strengthens the incentive to raise education
quality. On the other hand, the gain in terms of additional tax payments is pw
lower under domestic competition, as this is the expected amount the students pay
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in taxes even if they graduate at the private university with quality level qPS1 = 0. As
the two opposing e¤ects cancel each other out exactly, the net incentives to invest in
education quality are the same under domestic and international competition, and
so are thus the equilibrium quality levels qPS2 and q

2.
Competition in a Changing Environment Revisited 2
As a result of the strong similarities between the equilibrium in the case of in-
ternational public competition and the one in the case of domestic competition
between a public and a private university, it is no surprise that the e¤ects of socio-
economic changes on the education quality levels, the quality and tuition fee dif-
ferentials and the allocation of students are the same under these two forms of
competition. Formally, this conclusion follows from the fact that qPS2 = q

2 implies
@qPS2 =@p = @q

2=@p, @q
PS
2 =@ = @q

2=@, @q
PS
2 =@N = @q

2=@N , and that t
PS = t
implies @tPS=@p = @t=@p, @tPS=@ = @t=@, @tPS=@N = @t=@N , etc.
Similarly, the e¤ects of a change in the income in ROW and the size of the pool of
talent on the tuition fees are the same in the current extension as in the basic model
in the paper. Formally, tPSi = t

i +pw implies @t
PS
i =@ = @(t

i +pw)=@ = @t

i =@
and @tPSi =@N = @(t

i + pw)=@N = @t

i =@N . Moreover, inserting q1 = 0 into (76)
and (77) gives the relationship tPS2 = 2t
PS
1 , leading tot
PS = tPS2  t
PS
1 = t
PS
1 . Then,
dtPS2 =dk = 2dt
PS
1 =dk = 2dt
PS=dk, k = p; ;N . That is, both tuition fees increase
or decrease along with the tuition fee di¤erential, as the socioeconomic environment
changes. Thus, an increase in the ROW income parameter or the size of the pool
of talent raises not only the tuition fee di¤erential but also both tuition fees. Also,
both tuition fees respond as ambiguous to changes in the stay rate as the tuition
fee di¤erential does. Consequently, all conclusions stated in propositions 1 to 3 and
corollary 1 carry over to the case of domestic competition without qualications.
There are no qualitative changes of the comparative statics results.
The situation is slightly more complicated in the corresponding equilibrium in
which the private university is the high-quality provider. Such an equilibrium can
exist under certain circumstances even if  = 0. However, even in this equilibrium,
if it exists, the tuition fee di¤erential t and threshold value a^ are given by (10)
and (11), which characterise the corresponding variables in the case of international
public competition. Also, the comparative statics conclusions in propositions 1 to 3
with respect to the levels of education quality, the quality and tuition fee di¤erential
and the allocation of students across the two university are qualitatively the same.
In this sense, our comparative statics conclusions are fairly robust across di¤erent
forms of competition.
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B.3 Domestic Students (Section 6)
In section 6 of the paper, we argue that including domestic students into the analysis
provides a more comprehensive picture of the competition for the international pool
of talent, especially as universities often invest in general education quality, i.e., in
quality that benets both domestic and foreign students in the same way. We now
give a more detailed derivation of the results presented in section 6 of the paper
without, however, repeating all the basic assumptions of this variant of the model,
as they are already stated in the paper.
Recall from the paper that there is a given pool of domestic talent of size D
in each country, and that this pool is characterised by the same uniform ability
distribution which also describes the pool of international students. However, these
domestic students are internationally immobile. Only general (and not specic) ed-
ucation quality, denoted by qDi , is provided to both domestic and foreign students.
As a preliminary step, let us consider the optimal education policy of each country
in the case in which only domestic students exist. We look at this case rst because
we want to discover under which conditions all potential domestic students choose
to attend the local university.
The wage of non-graduates is normalised to zero, implying that natives enrol
at their domestic university if graduate wage w + aqi exceeds the tuition fee for
domestic students. Then, with a domestic pool of talent only, each governments
objective function, denoted by the superscript Donly, contains the wage sum of
domestic graduates and the education costs, and is given by
RDonly = (1  a^D)D

w +
1
2
(1 + a^D)q

  c(q)

  F (q), (80)
where a^D stands for the threshold ability level of the domestic students (we suppress
the country index i for the time being). As already stated in the paper, tuition fees for
domestic students and taxes paid by natives are welfare-neutral and thus do not enter
the objective function. As a result, the tuition fees for domestic students are simply
designed such that the optimal share of the domestic pool of talent receives higher
education. Note that a^D = 0 implies that all domestic students attend university;
thus, the market for domestic students is fully covered. As stated in the paper, we are
interested in exactly this case, where all potential domestic students are enrolled,
and where the two countries compete for the international pool of students only.
This simple setting already allows us to sketch some implications of the interplay
between the competition for the international pool of talent and a domestic student
body. We rst discuss the condition under which the case a^D = 0 emerges as optimal
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outcome. (Obviously, there always exists a set of tuition fee levels that guarantees
a^D = 0.)
Taking the derivative of RDonly with respect to a^D yields
@RDonly
@a^D
=  D
 
w + a^Dq   q

, implying
@RDonly
@a^D
ja^D=0  0, w  q. (81)
Thus, each governments will implement a tuition fee such that all potential domestic
students will enrol (i.e., a^D = 0) if the condition w  q, the condition for a fully
covered market for domestic students, is fullled. (Note that @2RDonly=@(a^D)2 =
 Dq  0 for q  0, which guarantees that a^D = 0 is indeed optimal if w  q.)
Next, let us discuss the optimal level of education quality in the absence of
international students. The derivative of RDonly with respect to the general quality
level q,
@RDonly
@q
= (1  a^D)D

1
2
(1 + a^D)  

 
@F
@q
, (82)
can only be positive at q = 0 if  < 1
2
(1 + a^D) or, for a^D = 0,  < 1=2. Only
then can a positive education quality result, and we assume that  < 1=2 is indeed
satised. In fact, for a su¢ciently large w and a su¢ciently small , the market for
domestic students is fully covered in optimum, which can be achieved by setting the
tuition fee for domestic students such that it falls short of the net graduate base
salary (1  )w, and the optimal quality level qDonly is positive and characterised by
@RDonly=@q = 0 (assuming, as we have implicitly done before, that @F (0)=@q is also
su¢ciently small; note that the second-order condition @RDonly=@q =  @2F=@q2 < 0
is fullled).
Quality and Tuition Fee Competition Revisited 3
We now add international students to the model and, as mentioned above, consider
general education quality, which a¤ects both foreign and domestic students in the
same way. We assume that the condition w  q is satised, meaning that all
domestic students attend university when each government optimally chooses the
tuition fees for its domestic students (adding international students does not a¤ect
this condition).
The governments of the two countries again enter tuition fee and quality com-
petition for foreign students, whose demand is still characterised by threshold value
(3). Rewriting the governments objective functions (18) in an extended form gives
RD1 = D

(w +
1
2
qD1 )  c(q
D
1 )

+ a^N

p

w +
1
2
a^qD1

+ t1   c(q
D
1 )

 F (qD1 ), (83)
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RD2 = D

(w +
1
2
qD2 )  c(q
D
2 )

+ (1  a^)N

p

w +
1
2
(1 + a^) qD2

+ t2   c(q
D
2 )

  F (qD2 ). (84)
Comparing these objective function with (6) and (7) yields RDi =
D

(w + (1=2)qDi )  q
D
i

+ Ri. Therefore, as @D

(w + (1=2)qDi )  q
D
i

=@ti = 0
holds, @RDi =@ti = @Ri=@ti results. (Recall that ti still stands for the tuition fees for
international students, which can di¤er from those for domestic students.) Thus, the
rst-order conditions in the second stage (tuition fee competition) are identical in
the cases with and without domestic students, and so are the tuition fees, the tuition
fee di¤erential and the allocation of students. Hence, the outcome of the tuition fee
competition is still fully described by (8), (9), (10) and (11).
Next, let us consider the quality competition in the rst stage. The equilib-
rium quality levels are characterised by the conditions (19) and (20) in the pa-
per. Comparing the rst-order condition (20) with (13) reveals that @RD2 =@q2 =
D(1=2  ) + @R2=@q2 > @R2=@q2 for  < 1=2, which implies q
D
2 > q

2 for  < 1=2.
Similarly, @RD2 =@q2 = (N=2)(p + 2%)(1   a^)
2 + @RDonly2 =@q2 > @R
Donly
2 =@q2 yields
qD2 > q
Donly
2 .
Furthermore, inspection of condition (19) shows that, for  < 1=2,
@RD1 =@q1

q1=0
R 0, D R [a^2(p + 2%)N   2(@F1(0)=@q1)]=(1  2), leading to
qD1
8<
:= 0 = q1 if D 
a^2(p+2%)N 2(@F1(0)=@q1)
1 2
;
> 0 = q1 if D >
a^2(p+2%)N 2(@F1(0)=@q1)
1 2
:
(85)
The role of the sizes of domestic and foreign student cohorts can immediately be
inferred from (85). For  < 1=2, educational quality in the low-quality country
will be positive and thus higher than in the case without domestic students if D
is su¢ciently large or N is su¢ciently small. Otherwise, the educational quality in
this country will be zero, as it will also be if   1=2.
Competition in a Changing Environment Revisited 3
As a nal step, we will now show how including domestic students into the analy-
sis a¤ects the way changes in the socio-economic environment shape international
competition. We focus on the scenario with qD1 > 0 because our propositions 1 to
3 and corollary 1 would trivially remain valid if qD1 = 0 resulted. Importantly, as
the allocation of students is still characterised by (11), all comparative statics re-
sults of propositions 1 to 3 with respect to this threshold level remain valid without
qualication.
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Regarding the other equilibrium values, we begin by investigating the e¤ects
of the stay rate on the educational quality in the two countries. Consider rst the
e¤ect on quality qD1 . Since the income e¤ect in (19) is independent of p, the impact
of the stay rate on educational quality runs through the competitive e¤ect only, and
comparative statics leads to
dqD1
dp
R 0, d
2RD1
dqD1 dp
=  
1
2
a^N

 + 2
@%
@p

a^+ 2 (p + 2%)
da^
dp

T 0. (86)
As @%=@p  0 (see (32)) and da^=dp < 0 (see (33)) work into opposite directions,
the sign of the term dqD1 =dp is unclear. We can show that dq1=dp < 0 results in the
scenario with  = 0 (implying @%=@p = 1  ) and  = 0, while dq1=dp > 0 holds in
the special case with ROW =  and  = 1 (implying @%=@p = 0).
Regarding country 2, from (20) follows
dqD2
dp
> 0,
d2RD2
dqD2 dp
=
1
2
(1  a^)N

(1  a^)

 + 2
@%
@p

  2 (p + 2%)
da^
dp

> 0, (87)
where @%=@p  0 (see again (32)) and da^=dp < 0 (see again (33)) yield the last
inequality sign (see (36), which is completely in line with (87)). That is, the educa-
tional quality in country 2 unambiguously increases with the stay rate, as it does
in the basic model without domestic students. Since, however, the e¤ect of the stay
rate on qD1 is ambiguous, its impact on the quality di¤erential q
D cannot be de-
termined without further specication. Calculations with the quadratic xed cost
function F (qi) = (1=2)q
2
i indicate that dq
D=dp < 0 is only possible if the cost
parameter  is rather large, which implies a threshold value a^ that is fairly close
to one. Conversely, the quality di¤erential qD increases with the stay rate p for
a small cost parameter , at least in the case of this quadratic xed cost function.
Then, propositions 1 to 3 and corollary 1 remain valid.
The impact of the stay rate on the tuition fee di¤erential is already ambiguous
in the basic model of the paper, and the ambiguity of the sign of dqD=dp further
adds to the ambiguity of the sign of the term dt=dp, as comparing (38) with the
following derivative shows:
dt
dp
= 

dqD
dp
+qD

d

dp
+
@

@%
@%
@p

(88)
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qD
p
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@
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p

| {z }
:="
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@
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| {z }
:="
;%>0
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@%
@p
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%|{z}
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Next, we analyse the impact of an increase in the income in ROW. The e¤ect of
a higher income in the rest of the world on the educational quality in country 1 is
ambiguous, as shown by
dqD1
d
T 0, d
2RD1
dqD1 d
T 0,  3%(p + %  )  p(p   2) T 0. (90)
Inspection of (90) reveals that the term dqD1 =d becomes negative for small values
of the cost parameter  (e.g., for  = 0), while dqD1 =d is positive for large values of
 (e.g.,  ! p + 2%, implying a^ ! 1). That is, the educational quality in country
1 decreases (increases) with the ROW income parameter  if the cost parameter 
is small (large). By contrast, the impact of the income parameter  on educational
quality qD2 is clear-cut:
dqD2
d
> 0,
d2RD2
dqD2 d
> 0, 3%p + 6%2 + 2p + 3% > 0, (91)
where the last inequality, which is the same as the one in the case without domestic
students (see (42)), always holds. Thus, the education quality in country 2 always
increases with the ROW income parameter . Nevertheless, the ambiguity of the
sign of the term dqD1 =d carries over to the sign of the term dq
D=d. The quality
di¤erential qD increases with the parameter  if the education cost  is su¢ciently
small (as quality qD2 increases and quality q
D
1 decreases in this case), while the
di¤erential qD can decline if the the parameter  is su¢ciently large (as we can
show for the case of a quadratic xed cost function, the increase in quality qD1 can
exceed the rise in quality qD2 ).
Again, the ambiguity of dqD=d makes the e¤ect of  on the tuition fee di¤er-
ential tD ambiguous too, since
dt
d
=
@
D
@
@
@
q + 
D
dqD
d
T 0, (92)
where the rst-term of the right-hand side of the equation sign is positive, which
follows from (39) and @%=@ = (1 p)(1 ROW )  0 (see (1)). If the term dq
D=d
were su¢ciently negative, then dt=d could be negative as well. Without further
calculations, we cannot exclude this case. However, for su¢ciently small education
costs , the quality di¤erential qD increases with the ROW income parameter 
for sure, and so does the tuition fee di¤erential t, all in line with proposition 2.
Finally, consider the e¤ect of the size of the talent pool on educational quality.
Comparative statics reveals
dqD1
dN
< 0,
d2RD1
dqD1 dN
< 0,  
1
2
a^2(p + 2%) < 0, (93)
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dqD2
dN
> 0,
d2RD2
dqD2 dN
> 0,
1
2
(1  a^)2(p + 2%) > 0, (94)
where (94) is completely in line with (47). As @qD1 =@N < 0 and @q
D
2 =@N > 0,
dqD=dN > 0 results, which in turn implies
@tD
@N
= 
D
dqD
dN
> 0 (95)
(compare with (48)). The conclusions about the quality and tuition fee di¤erentials
are identical to those reached in proposition 3.
References
Beine, M., Docquier, F. and H. Rapoport (2008). Brain Drain and Human Cap-
ital Formation in Developing Countries: Winners and Losers, The Economic
Journal 118, 631-652.
Beine, M., Noël, R. and L. Ragot (2014). The Determinants of International Mo-
bility of Students, Economics of Education Review 41, 40âe54.
Boadway, R., Marceau N. and M. Marchand (1996). Issues in Decentralizing the
Provision of Education, International Tax and Public Finance 3, 311-327.
Büttner, T. and R. Schwager (2004). Regionale Verteilungse¤ekte der Hochschul-
nanzierung und ihre Konsequenzen, in: Franz, W., Ramser, H. J., Stadler, M.
(eds.), Bildung, 33. Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Seminar Ottobeuren, Tübin-
gen, 251-278.
Chalo¤, J. and G. Lemaitre (2009). Managing Highly-skilled Labour Migration: A
Comparative Analysis of Migration Policies and Challenges in OECD Coun-
tries, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper 79.
Cigno, A. and A. Luporini (2009). Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing
Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard, Journal of Public Economic
Theory 11, 55-87.
De Fraja, G. and E. Iossa (2002). Competition among Universities and the Emer-
gence of the Elite Institution, Bulletin of Economic Research 54, 257-293.
Del Rey, E. (2001). Economic Integration and Public Provision of Education, Em-
pirica 28, 203-218.
46
Demange, G. and R. Fenge (2010). Competition in the Quality of Higher Education:
The Impact of Students Mobility, Working Paper 2010-27, Paris School of
Economics.
Dos Santos, M.D. and F. Postel-Vinay (2003). Migration as a Source of Growth:
The Perspective of a Developing Country, Journal of Population Economics
16, 161-175.
Dreher, A. and P. Poutvaara (2011). Foreign Students and Migration to the United
States, World Development 39, 1294-1307.
Eggert, W., Krieger, T. and V. Meier (2010). Education, Unemployment and Mi-
gration, Journal of Public Economics 94, 354-362.
Finn, M. (2003). Stay Rates of Foreign Doctorate Recipients from U.S. Universities,
Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, Oak Ridge.
Gabszewicz, J.J. and J.-F. Thisse (1979). Price Competition, Quality and Income
Disparities, Journal of Economic Theory 20, 340-395.
Gérard, M. (2007). Financing Bologna: Which Country will Pay for Foreign Stu-
dents?, Education Economics 15, 441-454.
Grazzini, L., Luporini, A. and A. Petretto (2010). Competition between State Uni-
versities, Working Paper 02/2010, Dipartimento die Scienze Economiche, Uni-
versità degli Studi di Firenze.
Haupt, A., Krieger, T. and T. Lange (2014). Education Policy, Student Migration,
and Brain Gain, in: Gérard, M. and S. Uebelmesser (eds.), The Mobility of
Students and the Highly Skilled: Implication for Education Financing and
Economic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge/MA, 287-319.
Hoyt, W. and R. Jensen (2001). Product Di¤erentiation and Public Education,
Journal of Public Economic Theory 3, 69-93.
Hübner, M. (2012). The Welfare E¤ects of Discriminating between In-state and
Out-of-state Students, Regional Science and Urban Economics 42, 364-374.
Kemnitz, A. (2007a). University Funding Reform, Competition, and Teaching Qual-
ity, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 163, 356-378.
Kemnitz, A. (2007b). Educational Federalism and the Quality E¤ects of Tuition
Fees, Dresdner Discussion Paper in Economics 08/07, Dresden University of
Technology.
47
Krieger, T. and T. Lange (2010). Education Policy and Tax Competition with
Imperfect Student and Labor Mobility, International Tax and Public Finance
17, 587-606.
Lange, T. (2009). Public Funding of Higher Education when Students and Skilled
Workers are Mobile, FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analysis 65, 178-199.
Lange, T. (2013). Return Migration of Foreign Students and Non-Resident Tuition
Fees, Journal of Population Economics 26, 703-718.
OECD (2011). Education at a Glance, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2014). Education at a Glance, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2015). Education at a Glance, OECD, Paris.
Rosenzweig, M. (2006). Global Wage Di¤erences and International Student Flows,
in: Collins, S.M. and C. Graham (eds.): Brookings Trade Forum 2006: Global
Labor Markets?, Brookings Press, 57-86.
Rosenzweig, M. (2008). Higher Education and International Migration in Asia:
Brain Circulation, in: Lin, J.Y. and B. Pleskovic (eds.): Higher Education and
Development, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 59-84.
Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982). Relaxing Price Competition Through Product
Di¤erentiation, Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-13.
Stark, O., Helmenstein, C. and A. Prskawetz (1997). A Brain Gain with a Brain
Drain, Economics Letters 55, 227-234.
Stark, O., Helmenstein, C. and A. Prskawetz (1998). Human Capital Depletion, Hu-
man Capital Formation, and Migration: A Blessing or a Curse?, Economics
Letters 60, 363-367.
Stark, O. and Y. Wang (2002). Inducing Human Capital Formation Migration as
a Substitute for Subsidies, Journal of Public Economics 86, 29-46.
Vidal, J.-P. (1998). The E¤ect of Emigration on Human Capital Formation, Journal
of Population Economics 11, 589-600.
Zissimos, B. and M. Wooders (2008). Public Good Di¤erentiation and the Intensity
of Tax Competition, Journal of Public Economics 92, 1105-1121.
48
